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PREFACE
The developed countries of today were developing countries a few centuries
ago, some a few dacades ago. Energy-related problems of developing countries look
serious today. Did they look difficult in the developing countries of the past?
What solutions were explored then?
These questions called for an answer when the Energy Research Group was
charged with the task of suggesting energy research priorities for developing
countries. So we turned to Professor Juan Martinez-Alier, a habitué of the great
libraries of Berlin, Paris and Oxford, who was in search of energy researchers of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This paper presents some of his
early results.
Professor Martinez-Alier seeks the views of early European researchers on
two questions: (i) the efficiency of the human body and the productivity of human
physical activity, and (ii) the exhaustibility of fossil fuels and other mineral
resources. In his search he encounters a strange and fascinating set of people:
Serhii Podolinsky, a socialist and adherent of' Marx and Engels, Eduard Sacher and
Wilhelm Ostwald, pioneers in what may be called the energetic theory of
civilization; Justus Liebig, inventor of synthetic phosphatic fertilizer; Patrick
Geddes, a biologist who was led by eye trouble into a melange of aesthetics,
energetics and economics; Frederick Soddy, a colleague of Rutherford who, after
winning a Nobel Prize in chemistry, turned to economics and would have
revolutionized it if anyone had listened to him; Howard Scott, the evangelist of
technocracy; Josef Popper, a physicist whose pornography won Freud's acclaim; and
Karl Ballod, a utopian who tried to provide a blueprint that Marx forgot to make
for the post-revolutionary society. Martinez-Alier'a account brings some




The role of' energy in the economy seems a recent preoccupation, which some
readers would trace back to the oil crisis of 1973 and other, perhaps better
informed readers would associate with Georgescu-Roegen's The Entropy Law and the
Economic Progress (1971). But in fact there is a long history of study of energy
in the analysis of the economy from the ecological point of view.
The period covered in our work begins with Jevons's The Coal Question (1865)
-- a time when the laws of thermodynamics had been estabished. It is more
difficult to choose an ending point for a history of ecological economics. The
best-known early attempt to work out the economic theory of exhaustible resources
was by 1-lotelling (1931). We accept this as the culmination of the dialogue
between natural scientists and economists, because the economic theory of'
exhaustible resources took into account the physical characteristics of this type
of resource. Economists had finally agreed that some resources were exhaustible,
although this consensus would take a long time to seep down to the textbooks. The
1930s is a convenient ending point also because short-run problems of excess
capacity came to dominate macroeconomics and the question of whether the
availability of resources would stop economic growth was no longer on the agenda.
However, Keynesian economics rapidly became also an economics of long-run growth
(Harrod, 1939). Economists were concerned with national income, investment,
consumption and the incremental capital-output ratio, and they paid no attention
whatever to physical realities, as lee (1950) pointed out (p. 415-416).
In fact, there is no end in sight to the ecological critique of' economic
theory, to which our work makes a further contribution by resurrecting the
arguments of half-forgotten authors.
Applied work on the economics of natural resources and energy use did not
become a branch of economics until recently. The best work was still being done
in the 1950s, 1960s and 197Dm by noneconomists (Cottrell, 1955; Rappaport, 1967;
Odum, 1971; Pimentel, 1973; Leach, 1975; Chapman, 1975; Foley, 1976). One
striking finding was that the productivity of' agriculture has not increased, but
decreased. This does not, however, mean that a new criterion of economic
efficiency should be introduced, such as energy return to input; agricultural
products have use values often related not to their energy content or energy cost,
but rather to their protein or vitamin content, or simply to the pleasure to be
gained by eating or drinking them. Nevertheless, studies of the flow of energy in
agriculture suggest it may no longer be appropriate to analyze economic growth in
terms of an increased productivity of agriculture (based upon technical progress)
which, together with the low income-elasticity of demand for agricultural
products, frees labour to other sectors of the economy.
It might be that the increase in agricultural productivity by using oil has
been assessed only at the oil prices that have tamed. If the value of oil to
future generations has not been taken into account, the increase in productivity
is fictitious. To economic theorists, the question may be one of giving values
across the generations to the stocks of fossil fuels and other exhaustible
resources, to show an acceptable, or even optimal rate of depletion. Such an
exercise usually refers to Hotelling's (1931) rule, which compares the difference
in net return between now and a future date with the interest to be gained by
selling now and inve8ting the proceeds. But this criterion appears invalid;
compound interest can only accrue if' the economy grows -- a point emphasized by
Soddy (1922). Thus, we might discount the future if we assume that the future
will be more prosperous than the present; this is usually assumed in the theory of
economic growth, where current consumption is sacrificed to invest and increase
future consumption, and where the rate of interest equalizes the present
discounted value of consumption over time. But one should rather minimize present
use of exhaustible resources if one assumes a long life for humanity. In any
case, there is clearly no way of escaping an ethical choice. The methodology to
be used in making such a choice is difficult to decide on behalf of economic
agents who, being not yet born, cannot bid in today's markets.
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The first authors we shall consider did not deal, however, with such
abstruse methodological questions, but with straight energy accounting of
agriculture. It appears that Serhii Podolinsky, a Ukrainian socialist doctor,
first developed the concept of energy return to energy input in different types of
land use, trying to combine in articles (1880a, 1880b, 1881, 1883) this ecological
approach with the Marxist theory of economic value. Although one of these
articles was published in Die Iue Zeit, there has been no discussion of his views
in the Marxist literature on agricultural development. The relations between
Marxism and the natural sciences (centred on the notion of Produktivkiafte) is one
of the topics that need to be studied.
The energy analysis of agriculture was not picked up, either, by populist,
pro-peasant authors, although they could have developed an argument in favour of
peasant farming. Chayanov did not read Podolinsky. Many years later it was
pointed out that the Green Revolution of the 1960s was not green at all, either in
the old populist sense or in the new sense; it not only favoured rich peasants or
farmers over poor peasants and landless labourers, but it also meant farming with
petroleum.
While Podolinsky's intellectual efforts at least received a nonenthusiastic
report by Engels and considerable later attention in his own country and abroad,
complete silence appears to have greeted Eduard Sacher (1881, 1899), who also
studied, as we shall see, the flow of energy in agriculture. Sacher himself was
keen on energy-intensive farming, but he was aware of the increase in the energy
input that chemical fertilizers and steam threshing implied. He also had the idea
of correlating stages in the history of humankind with energy use per capita.
There is also interesting material on energy accounting in agriculture in
the work of another Austrian author, Josef Popper-Lynkeus (1912), who published
Die allge.eine Nährpflicht, a fundamental text of ecological economics, full of
detailed computations of resources and of their use. He proposed an economy that
would make decreasing use of exhaustible resources. He considered to what extent
renewable energy from agricultural crops could be substituted for coal (in the
form of alcohol from potatoes, Kartoffel Spiritus), taking a pessimistic view
because he quite properly included in his accounting the energy cost of growing
such crops. Such analysis is directly relevant to the discussion today on energy
cropping versus food production, as for instance in Brazil.
Popper-Lynkeus was a physicist, a friend of Ernst Mach; he was influential
in the Vienna Circle. Particularly did he influence Otto Neurath (1973, 1979),
whose economics based upon a Naturalractiisiq will be considered in our work.
Another influence on Otto Neurath's economics was that of Karl Ballad (1898,
1927), a Berlin economist, and, like Popper-Lynkeus, a left-wing ecologist and
author of a scientific utopia.
Around 1840 -- before the laws of energetics were established -- the new
agricultural chemistry had started with Liebig (1869, 1873) in Germany and
Boussingault (1845) in France. Liebig often appears in textbooks as a founding
father of ecology (cf. Kormondy, 1965) because of his work on the cycles of carbon
and some plant nutrients. He liked to think that his own work, of which he became
a commercial propagandist, would help greatly to avoid a crisis of subsistence in
Europe. This would occur unless "heaps of dung and guano deposits of the size of
English coalfields" were discovered -- a phrase admiringly quoted by Kautsky
(1899) -- or unless the new gospel of inorganic chemical fertilization was
adopted. But was it often pointed out that European agriculture was starting to
draw upon nonrenewable material subsidies? Did anybody point out that Peru was
exporting much more energy than it was importing? Did perhaps some economists
discuss (though not yet using such technical terms) the "shadow-price" of guano
which would ensure an optimal rate of depletion? Such questions are clearly
rhetorical; about 100 years later the exports by Peru of enormous amounts of
basically the same resource -- though this time at an earlier stage in the trophic
chain (in the form of fish-meal for North-Atlantic animals) -- did not prompt such
a debate.
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Around the turn of the century, there was indeed a discussion on the energy
cost of substituting for Chilean saltpetre nitrogen taken from the air by
hydroelectricity (Juriech, 1908); the analysis of the flow of energy in modern
agriculture could have become a well-trodden study much earlier than it did.
Going back to the more general theme of the relation (or lack of it) between
economics and the study of the flow of energy in human society, one should also
consider the views of Jevons. Jevans, one of the progenitors of pure economic
theory, was up to date in science as shown in his exchanges with John Herschel,
Clerk Maxwell and others (1972), and also by his treatise on the Principles of
Science (1879). In The Coal Question (1865) he did not develop the economic
theory of the intergenerational allocation of this exhaustible resource. He
rather addressed himself to the substantive issues of coal reserves and of
improving the thermodynamic efficiency of coal-driven machines. He expressed the
dismal view that as thermodynamic efficiency increased, so would the use of coal.
One certainly cannot dismiss Jevons as a professionalized economist ignorant of
natural sciences. The question we ask is why, despite his interest in coal, he
did not consider the intertemporal allocation of exhaustible resources in his work
on "marginalist" economics.
We shall also briefly touch upon the work of Walras (1965), who rarely
mentioned physical matters except to remark often on the analogy (which also
pleased Jevons) between the equations of mechanics and of economic equilibrium.
This analogy was also noticed later by Lotka (1921). But the most interesting
point of contact between Walras and ecological economics was the correspondence he
had with Patrick Geddes, the Scottish urban and regional planner.
Geddes (1881, 1884, 1885) is difficult to classify and certainly difficult
to read. He criticized the attempt to explain demand by the notion of "utility"
on the grounds that it was tautological. The new economics -- he wrote to Wairas
in 1883 -- was unsatisfactory also on the supply side, as production should be
studied with the help of physics. He developed the basic principles of a sort of
tthleau economique, and he criticized economic accounting because it did not keep
track of the losses of energy and materials in the economic process. He believed
that a part of consumption could be explained by biology, but he was by no means a
reductionist (despite his training in biology and his Comtean view of the
relations between the sciences). His favourite economist was John Ruskin, who had
emphasized esthetic values. Geddes was also one of the first authors who tried to
interpret history in terms of changes in the use of energy. Another historian
who, at the turn of the century, had this idea was the American Henry Adams (1918,
1919, 1969).
In general, physicists seem to have been reluctant to invade the terrain of
historians and economists, yet many of them rushed into theology; there was a
vogue for metaphysical speculation because of the second law of thermodynamics.
We have found few examples of explicit discussions of the economy from the
standpoint of physics. One is by Rudolf Clausius (1885) on the energy reserves in
nature and their benefit for humankind. This is significant not only because of
its author's personality, but also because of what it says on the sources of
economic growth -- "we have found stocks of coal from old times ... These we are
now using and we behave just as a happy heir eating up a rich legacy." The
history of ecological economics is not an exercise in legitimization of today's
green movement; left-wing ecologism was not invented in the 1960s and 1970s but
nearly 100 years earlier. Clausius, however, must be understood in another
context.
Why did other natural scientists not trespass into the economists' field?
Natural scientists, mathemeticians and engineers, including Carnot (1978), Babbage
(1971), Thomson (1860) and Clausius himself, had long been concerned with the
efficiency of power-producing machines, especially the steam engine. Some, such
as Babbage, are also catalogued as economists. From the mid-nineteenth century
onward, the physiologist8 also came to consider the efficiency in the
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transformation of energy of plants and animals (including the human body), as a
central question in their research. But we can ask why the entropy law and the
economic process did not become a well-established field of study in the 1850s, as
might have happened. Clearly, to answer this question requires studies of the
ideological and political background of scientists. These are themes related to
the work of authors such as Cannon (1978), Gregory (1977), Musson (1972), and
Krohn et al. (1978). For instance, there has been work on the views of Clausius
on physics and the foundations of science (Truesdell, 1980; Schneider, 1979), and
a part of his biography has been written (Ronge, 1955); we shall have more to say
about the economic, political and cultural context of this.
One other physicist (of minor importance in his own discipline) who wrote on
the economy was Leopold Pfaundler. In a brief article (1902) he analyzed the
carrying capacity of the Earth, with detailed calculations on the solar energy
falling on the soil and photosynthesized by plants and of the need of food energy
for human nutrition. His article states clearly that the expression "energy
crisis" should be reserved for situations in which there are humans unable to
obtain the 1500 or 2000 Calories per day (6278-8372 ki/d) that they would need for
sustenance, and that the cause of such energy crises is not the niggardliness of
nature, but poor social organization, mainly the restrictions on mobility placed
by frontiers.
Pfaundler's main thesis was that the carrying capacity of the earth was
determined not by the availability of materials but by free energies, because the
law of conservation of matter enables materials to be completely recycled (an
early statement of what Georgescu-Roegen calls the "energetic dogma"). One other
contribution by Pfaundler was his awareness of the possible links between
socialdarwinism and the study of the use of energy and materials by humanity. He
frequently used the expression der Kf ia Dasein, the struggle for life, yet he
refrained from expressing such links in any eugenicist and racist way.
Socialdarwinism is inevitably one theme that crops up in our research, against our
wishes and those of some of our authors, who held strongly egalitarian and
anti-socialdarwinist views.
The human species is distinguished by enormous differences between its
members in their use of energy and materials, a point usually attributed to
Lotka (1925). We can envisage a dog crossing the Atlantic by Concorde at a great
expense of fuel, but if we exclude human intervention, intraspecific differences
in the use of energy and materials are small in all species compared to those for
humankind.
In our list of authors, Frederick Soddy (1912, 1922, 1926, 1947) deserves a
prominent place. To emphasize the role of agriculture in the economy, Soddy drew
a distinction between the "vital" use of energy and its "laboral" use. From 1903
onwards he told economists to study the human use of energy. He blamed economists
for mistaking chrematistics for economics. It is difficult to classify Soddy as
an optimist or a pessimist on economic growth. He certainly believed in the
progress of scientific knowledge but not that this necessarily entailed technical
progress, though he sometimes got carried away by the energy vistas opened up by
radioactivity. Soddy's main point was that economists were mistaking financial
capital for real capital. He pointed out that the payment of interest could only
arise from either growth or the impoverishment of debtors, and that there was no
pure theory of economic growth since growth depended in the last analysis on
physical factors, that is, the availability of energy. The using up of fossil
fuels could only be squandering, even if fossil fuels were spent in the
construction of so-called capital goods.
Ostwald's contribution was less polemical against the economists than
Soddy's and directed more to the historians. He failed in his upper-handed
attempt at dialogue with them and with social scientists. He later became the
recognized ancestor of ecological anthropology in the United States (through
Leslie White). The true heads of this lineage ought to be Podolinsky, Sacher,
Geddes.
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Our approach to Ostwald's social energetics will be by way of Max Weber's
detailed and little-known critique (1909), not yet translated into English. Of
particular interest is Weber's discussion of the relations between the sciences.
Ostwald was episternologically a Comtean, and Comte did not understand (Weber
wrote) that each science dealt separately with an object of knowledge, using a set
of hypothetical-theoretical propositions, the validity of which did not depend on
the findings of any other discipline. Discussing Ostwald's view that the
development of culture went together with an improvement in the efficiency of the
transformation of energy, Max Weber cleverly pointed out that it was energetically
cheaper to weave cloth by hand than mechanically; nevertheless mechanical weaving
was presumably a sign of cultural progress. Ostwald had missed his salts ortale
from physics to economics. One may well imagine that scientists (or peasant
ideologues) who nowadays point out to economists that modern agriculture implies a
worsening of the energy output-input ratio will be told the issue has nothing to
do with economics.
To sum up, the study of the questions raised by our authors will make it
clear that ecologic economics could have been developed long ago. The question
remains why few natural scientists wrote on the economy in the second half of the
nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century (we have not yet
made a complete count, but it is clear that there were not many). A related
question is why so little attention (at least until 1973) was paid to
interdisciplinarity by economists and economic historians, who should have known
better. And, finally, why was the left-wing ecological critique of economics not
adopted as an ideology by any social group until quite recently? These are
questions about the separation and the relations between the sciences, about the
social and ideological functions of science, about the sociology and the history
of science (cf. Graham et al., 1983). We hope to make some contributions to such
issues.
Before 1973 and even now one could go through many volumes of economic
theory, economic history and agricultural economic history without finding as a
central question the use of energy and of material resources. There is no entry
for energy in the index to David Landes's Unbound Prometheus (1969).
Such elements of economics as productivity, technical progress, net
investment and growth of productive capacity and value added seem nowadays
singularly metaphysic. The belief in economic growth may help to explain the
resilience of economics faced with the ecological critique.
On the other hand, we would stress that a reductionist methodology that
attempts to explain human use of energy and material resources with the help of
the natural sciences could not account for the complexities of human history.
Ecology cannot explain why some members of humanity use perhaps one tonne of
petroleum yearly to feed each one of them (for tractors, transport, fertilizers,
herbicides, refrigerators, etc.) while many other members feed themselves without
using one single drop of petroleum. The allocation of energy and material
resources to different uses cannot be explained (for the human species) only by
natural sciences.
THE STUDY OF THE FLOW OF ENERGY IN AGRICULTURE: P000LINSKY
"The beginning of the influence that the second law of thermodynamics was to
have on ecological theory" has been traced back to Lotka (1925) by E.P. Odui
(1968, P. 15). In fact, the study of the flow of energy and of energetic
efficiencies in human societies started earlier, though it did not become an
academic discipline. There is nothing startling in this. Too often a rich past
of ideas, concepts, controversies, personal failures and successes falls into
oblivion as the history of disciplines that have finally found their academic
niches is written. Thus, "the ecosystem approach to ecology which was developed
by the Odum brothers out of the thoughts of Lindeman ... (based upon) food chains,
energy flow, trophic levels, and ecological efficiencies" (Colinvaux, 1976; cf.
also Ellen, 1982, p. 95) began much earlier than the names quoted would suggest.
We should like to introduce some writings that, although published about 100 years
ago, read like recent contributions to ecological anthropology, human ecology and
energy economics, as they were based on computations of energy returns to energy
inputs in different activities. Such initial attempts (around 1880) were
generally received with silence; hence one cannot exclude the possibility of
precursors in the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s.
The work we shall consider could have been a foundation stone for hunan
ecology, ecological anthropology and energy economics. The study of the flow of
energy and the cycles of materials in small hunan groups, (Rappaport, 1967; Lee,
1979) is usually classified as ecological anthropology while, for instance,
Energy Flows in Rural China (Smil, 1979) belongs to human ecology. However,
anthropologists like Leslie White and, more recently, R.N. Adams, have also
attempted work of the widest scope. Moreover, some small-scale studies, for
instance Brooke Thomas (1976) on the flow of energy in a settlement of Quechua
shepherds in Puno, Peru, which shows the reasons for the use of dung as fuel, are
classified as hunan ecology. this is perhaps because they do not attempt links
with other fields -- social organization, religious beliefs and rituals -- as the
anthropologists do. Although comparative studies on energy flows in agriculture
(Pimentel, 1973, 1979; Leach, 1975) clearly belong to agricultural energy
economics, they use the findings of ecological anthropolgists on output-input
energy ratios in traditional systems, such as tropical slash-and-burn agriculture
or Chinese rice or Mexican maize growing.
From the 1850s and 1860s onwards it was possible to adopt a quantitative
view of the flow of energy from the sun (though that the sun worked by nuclear
fusion was not understood until the 1930s); it was also possible to determine how
much of the energy from the sun was radiated back from the Earth into space, and
how much (or, rather, how little) could be transformed by plants into carbon,
which they took from carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The process of' nutrition
as oxidation of carbon was also understood, as was the use of energy in metabolism
and in work.
Therefore, it is not surprising that there should have been attempts to
measure the energy output-input ratio in agriculture. One of the first was by
Serhii Podolinsky (1850-1891). This has become known mainly because Engels's
letters to Marx on Podolinaky were mentioned and even printed in full in the
1920s, both in the literature on the relations between marxism and natural
sciences and in biographical works on Podolinsky's role in Ukrainian populism and
socialism in the 1870s. Engels had some knowledge of the elementary energetics of
hunan physiology, and in a note of 1875 (cf. Engels, 1972) he referred to Fick's
and Wislicenus's experiment in climbing the Faulhorn in 1865, which became
popularized under the name "A day of hunger for science".
Adolf Fick (1829-1901) had written already in 1857 and 1858 on the amount
amount of energy (2 700 Calories/d) a man would use when not working (1906, vol.
IV, p. 418). Different types of work would imply different energy expenditures
over that rate. An idea circulated at the time -- for instance, in an article
(Anonymous, 1877) in Das Ausiand -- was that physical values of different kinds
of work could be established. Engels explicitly rejected this notion in 1875.
On 19 December 1882, Engels wrote to Marx that Rodolinsky had "discovered't
the following facts (already well known): If the food intake of one person per
day was equal to 10 000 kcal (41 860 kJ) then the physical work done would be a
fraction of this energy. This physical work would become economic work if
employed in fixing solar energy, for instance through agriculture. Whether the
energy fixed by the work of one person per day was equal to this amount, half,
twice or 100 times it would depend only on the degree of development of the means
of production. Establishing an energy budget was in any case possible only in the
most primitive branches of production, such as hunting and fishing.
In agriculture (here Engels was most perceptive) one would have to reckon
the energy value of such inputs as fertilizers and other aids, a difficult thing
to compute. In energy accounting in industry it would be impossible to calculate
the energy costs of a needle, screw or hammer. Economic relations could not be
expressed in physical terms. All that Podolinsky had managed to show (wrote
Engels to Marx, 22 December 1882) was the old story that all industrial producers
have to live from the products of agriculture; this well-known fact could, if one
so wished, be translated into the language of physics, but little would be gained
by it.
Podolinsky's original article appeared in similar Russian, French, Italian
and German versions between 1880 and 1883. We shall summarize it:
He began by explaining the laws of energetics, quoting Clausius: although
the energy of the universe wa8 a constant, there was a tendency to the dissipation
of energy or, in Clausius's terminology, a tendency for entropy to reach a
maximum. "Entropy" referred to the quantity of energy that would no longer be
transformed into other forms of energy. Podolinsky did not discuss the difference
in thermodynamics between open, closed and isolated systems, although he stated
explicitly, as the starting point of his analysis, that at present the Earth was
receiving enormous quantities of energy from the sun, and would do so for a very
long time. All physical and biological phenomena were expressions of the
transformation of this energy. He did not discuss either the controversies
regarding the creation of the universe and its "heat-death" or the relation
between thermodynamics and the theory of natural selection and evolution of
species. In March 1880 he had published an article against socialdarwinism. He
certainly realized that the availability of energy was a crucial consideration for
the increase (or decrease) of population. However, he thought that distribution
arose from productive relations, that poverty could not be explained by ecological
analysis -- "in the countries where capitalism triumphs, a great part of work goes
towards the production of luxury goods, that is to 8ay, towards a gratuitous
dissipation of energy instead of towards increasing the availability of energy."
The energy available to humankind came mainly from the sun. Podolinsky gave
figures for the solar constant (taken from Seechi) and for energy from other
sources. He explained how coal and oil, wind energy and waterfalls were
transformations of solar energy, and after mentioning tides as another possible
source of energy, he went on to his main piece of analysis.
A part of the flow of energy from the sun was assimilated by plants -- a
very small part, he wrote, without explicitly discussing photosynthetic yield, a
subject that had already been under scrutiny for some years. The work of human
beings and animals directed by humans was able to increase the energy budget on
the surface of Earth by agricultural activity. This he showed by comparing the
productivity of different types of land use in France (Table 1).
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Table 1. Average annual production and energy input from *rk
by h,noma and domeatic animals, France, 1870s




b Corresponding to 50 horse-hours and 80 manhours.
c Corresponding to 100 horse-hours and 200 manhours.
Source: Podolinsky, 1880. Podolinaky's sources were Statiatiqia de la France,
1874, 1875, 1878; Ch. Laboulaye, Dictiotviaire des arts et de l'agriculture, 4th
ed., 1877, articles on agriculture (by Hervé Mangon) and on carbonification;
Pelouze et Frémy, Traité cia Chimie; Hermann, Grundzüge der iysiologie, 5th
ad., 1877.
Forest Dried wood 900 2295 Nil
Pasture
Natural Hay 2500 6375 Nil




Podolinsky's figures correspond to the biologists' "net production". He
said nothing about the energy spent by plants in respiration which, although of
great interest to the biologist, has less interest for the ecological
anthropologist or economist. He compared wheat production and sown pastures with
natural pastures and forest, concluding an input of human and animal work
increased their production. Thus, there was an increase of 41 calories in the
output of pastures for every calorie of human and animal work expanded.
Podolinsky counted the energy input in terms of the work done, and not of the food
energy intake, which is the measure sometimes taken in contemporary studies in
ecological anthropolgy. Comparing wheatfields to natural pastures, each calorie
put in produced an increase of 22 calories. If forests were taken as the baseline
the energy productivity of human and animal work was, of course, even higher.
Labour, he said, could increase "the accumulation of' energy on Earth". Energy
accounting thus gave a scientific basis to the labour theory of value, a point
that neither Marx nor Engels appreciated.
Although he mentioned guano and although he must have been keenly aware of
the war then raging for Chilean saltpetre, he did not subtract from output or
include in the input the energy cost of fertilizers. Nor did he consider the
energy input of steam engines in agriculture, though he was fully aware of their
use for threshing. In its essentials, though, his methodology was like that used
much later to establish the energy balance for particular crops, for small-scale
societies or for the agricultural sectors of entire countries (Cottrell, 1955;
Rappaport, 1967; Pimentel, 1973, 1979; Leach, 1975; Brooke Thomas, 1976; Naredo
and Campos, 1980).
Podolinsky did not include solar radiation in the energy input, and here too
he anticipated the agricultural energy economics of today. If we wanted to study
the energy economics of domestic heating, we would pay attention to the fossil
fuels, wood or dung used to increase the temperature to (say) 15°C from -10°C or
-20°C, but we would take for granted the first long tranche, up from -273°C, which
is mostly due to solar energy. Although solar radiation was not included as
input, Podolinsky was interested in how much of this energy could be transformed
by plants. He attributed the energy of the sun to "dissociation" (quoting Seechi
and H. Saint-Claire Deville), and he explained Kirchhoff's law of radiation. He
quoted not only Clausius but also W. Thomson on the degradation of energy.
He wrote: "We have in front of us two parallel processes which together
form the so-called circuit of life. Plants have the property of accumulating
solar energy, but the animals, when they feed on vegetable substances, transform a
part of this saved energy into mechanical work and dissipate this energy into
space. If the quantity of energy accunulated by plants is greater than that
dispersed by animals, then stocks of energy appear, for instance in the period
when mineral coal was formed, during which vegetable life obviou8ly was
preponderant over animal life. If, on the contrary, animal life were
preponderant, the provision of energy would be quickly dispersed and animal life
would have to go back to the limits determined by vegetable wealth. So, a certain
equilibritin would have to be built between the accunulation and the dissipation of
energy." Apart from plants, hunan labour could be seen as retarding the
dissipation of energy. It achieved this by agriculture; but also the activities
of a tailor, a shoemaker or a builder would qualify, in Podolinsky's view, as
productive work as they afford "protection against the dissipation of energy into
Space."
Podolinsky, in the second part of his article, considered how the human
organism can do work -- "we have not yet said anything on the capacity of the
human organism to do work, without which it would be difficult to explain the
accumulation of energy on the surface of the Earth under the influence of labour."
Quoting from Him and Helmholtz (but not, though he could, from Adolf Fick,
Pettenkofer and Volt) he concluded that "man has the capacity to transform one
fifth of the energy gained from food into muscular work." He named this ratio, in
accordance with normal practice at the time, "economic coefficient", remarking
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that man was a more efficient transformer of energy than a steam engine. Taking
into account that not everybody can work (because of health and age), and that
there are other human needs beyond food energy, perhaps the best possible economic
coefficient would be a 10th. He then arrived at a general theoretical principle
on the minimum "natural conditions of human existence." He used a metaphor to put
this principle across: in Sadi Carnot's sense, "humanity is a machine that not
only turns heat and other physical forces into work, but succeeds also in carrying
out the inverse cycle, that is, it turns work into heat and other physical forces
which are necessary to satisfy our needs, and, so to speak, with its own work
turned into heat is able to heat its own boiler."
For humanity to ensure its conditions of existence, each unit of human work
must have then a productivity (this is his own term) of at least 10; or in more
general terms, the energy productivity of human work must be equal to or greater
than the economic coefficient, that is, the efficiency of the human body as a
thermic machine. Without that level of energy productivity "scarcity appears and,
many times, a reduction in population." Despite remarks such as this, Podolinsky
was -- as we said before -- explicitly anti-socialdarwinist. In economics he
thought he had reconciled the physiocrats with the labour theory of value. He
knew the physiocrats could not have made a study of energy flows, as the
mechanical equivalent of heat was established only in the early 1840s. His
combination of an energy theory of value and a labour theory of value was a
distinctive contribution. Sending his article to Marx in 1880, he explained that
he wanted to bring the doctrine of surplus labour (and implicitly of surplus
value) into harmony with physical theory.
It is a simplification to say that the human body has an efficiency of 20%,
which would become 10% taking into account other needs apart from food and the
fact that not everybody works. But what matters in the present context is the
idea that one could determine the minimum conditions of human survival through an
analysis of energy flows and efficiencies.
Podolinsky was on solid ground here. The first thoughts on the
physiological applications of the laws of energy had been voiced in the lB4Os.
Thus, Tait (1864, p. 344), patriotically noted that Joule had anticipated
Helmholtz when he said in a public lecture in April 1847, that "the knowledge of
the equivalency of heat to mechanical power is of great importance in solving a
great number of interesting and important questions. In the case of the steam
engine, by ascertaining the quantity of heat produced by the combustion of coal,
we can find out how much of it is converted into mechanical power, and thus come
to a conclusion how far the steam engine is susceptible to further improvement.
Calculations made upon this principle have shown that at least ten times as much
power might be produced as is now obtained by the combustion of heat. Another
interesting conclusion is that the animal frame, though destined to fulfil so many
other ends, is, as a machine, more perfect than the best contrived steam engine;
that is, is capable of more work with the same expenditure of fuel."
Neither Joule nor Helmholtz (1854) could have really calculated the
theoretical efficiency of a thermic machine before the second law of
thermodynamics was established in 1850 and 1851 by Clausius and Thomson. But the
thermodynamic comparison between the steam engine, animals and human body was made
before 1850 and had become a commonplace by the 1860s. Thus Tait could give as a
homely example of the application of conservation of energy to animal processes --
"the greater supply and choicer quality of food required by convicts in penal
servitude, than by their less (sic) fortunate comrades who are merely imprisoned"
(1864, p. 362). The elementary energetics of nutrition and hard work had therefore
been well established by the 1880s. It was now only necessary to bring together
the well-known facts that biomass could be measured in energy units and that the
human body is a thermic machine before the idea could emerge that one could relate
the principles of human ecology and economy to the concept of energy return to
human energy input.
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Podolinsky also saw clearly the difference between using the flow of solar
energy and the stock of energy in coal. The task of labour was to increase the
accumulation of solar energy on Earth rather than simply transform into work the
energy already accumulated, especially as work done with coal was inevitably
accompanied by a great dissipation of heat-energy into space. He was not,
however, at all pessimistic about the prospects for the economy, and he hoped
solar energy would be directly used industrially, referring to the "solar engine
of M. Mouchot". One could envisage that solar energy would one day be used
directly to make chemical syntheses of nutritive substances, bypassing
agriculture. Thus, demographics had to take into account "the relation between
the general quantity of energy on Earth and the quantity of humans who live on
it", and this was more relevant, in his view, than either the Malthusian
prognosis or the socialdarwinist approach of Haeckel, which he repudiated.
Podolinsky's contribution to human ecology, ecologic anthropology and
economics could have been picked up much earlier in the scientific debate. For
instance, any of the many students of the Russian and Ukrainian peasantry could
have had the idea of using the energy-accounting methods of this sympathetic
author. An argument (which Podolinaky himself did not develop) in favour of
greater energy efficiency in peasant agriculture could then have been made,
perhaps by populist authors, several decades before Geogescu-Roegen. Moreover,
the marxists could have paid greater attention to him. His article was published
in socialist journals in France and Italy and in the theoretical organ of the
German socialist party. We do not know yet the channels it followed on its way
to Die Neue Zeit, edited by Kautsky. Engels might have recommended its
publication, despite his lack of enthusiasm for it. But Kautsky (1899) did not
include a study of energy flow in his Die Agrarfraqe. Thus, although Podolinsky
can be placed at the crossroads of well-trodden intellectual paths, his work can
still be presented as a novelty. We do not claim, however, to have "discovered"
him; he has never been forgotten by his countrymen.
EDLJARD SACHER'S FORIIJLATION OF PODOIINSKY'S PRINCIPLE
In 1881 the reputable publishing house of Gustav Fischer in Jena issued a
book by a somewhat obscure author, Eduard Sacher, entitled Fotidations of a
Mechanics of Society. Sacher (1834-1903) published another book in 1899 with a
similar title and many of the same numerical examples, in which he expanded his
critiques of the economists' different theories of interest. We do not know yet
whether there were any relations between Sacher and other members of a sort of
Austrian school of ecological economics (Pfaundler, 1839-1920; Josef Popper,
1838-1921) or with Mach (1838-1916). Ostwald, who was younger than any of them,
did not do the kind of empirical work on energy accounting that the Austrians did,
although he is usually given the major role in social energetics. Hayek (1952),
himself an Austrian, included Ostwald but not any of his countrymen (except
Neurath) in his list of social energeticists (nor did he include Podolinsky). We
learned of Eduard Sacher through Zmavc (1926), which barely mentions him, say that
he introduced Sacher to social energetics, and explains that his work had no
impact. Be that as it may, Sacher is, with Podolinsky, one of the earliest
authors who wrote on energy and human society.
In his preface Sacher (1881) stated the natural sciences could provide a
basis for a rational economy. In the introduction he explained the mechanical
conversion of heat, introducing the energy unit kilocalorie or 424 kilogrametres,
which Clausius called 1 Werk. Throughout the book he used 1 W as a unit
where W stands both for Wärmeeiieit (i.e. kilocalorie) and for Werk.
He began by considering human beings as thermic machines. Physiology
explained the amount of work that a person could do. From the different estimates
of Poisson, Dupin and Saussure and Christian, he concluded that the maximum that
one worker can achieve is 1000 kcal/d, and that to do this work he needs at least
3000 kcal energy. Not all activity that is work in the physical sense is work in
the economic sense. Therefore, he estimated (after various considerations on the
share of the economically active population, number of holidays etc.) that the
work performed per worker-day would be equivalent perhaps to 450 kcal. He then
put forward an initial conclusion, which he later argued in more detail: "The
economic task of the available labour force consists of winning from nature the
greatest possible amount of energy" (p. 24). This would depend on its skill, on
its instruments, on the fertility of the soil, on the availability of waterfalls
and on the climate. One could say that northern nations were poor because of lack
of sunshine.
Energy sources were agricultural and forest production, hydraulic power,
minerals such as coal, wind power, domestic animals and the products of hunting
and fishing, all of them ultimately traceable to solar radiation. He then
estimated the energy available per person-year in cent;al Europe. Thus, one
hectare of pine forest would produce per year some 8.3 m' of wood, equivalent to
4980 kg of dried wood, which, at 3600 kcal/kg, was nearly 18 million kcal/ha.yr.
No sources were quoted. Sacher compared this output of energy with the amount of
solar energy to which that hectare of land during the year was exposed and
remarked on the small percentage converted. This image of an immense flow of
energy from the sun reflected back into space, with only a minute amount being
assimilated by plants, moved him to write, as if making a point in his classroom:
"Nature is incredibly rich." On one hectare of wheat, 2590 kg of wheat and 3000
kg of straw would be harvested -- such high yields were consistent with the high
yearly labour input of 180 workdays per hectare Sacher assumed, which was perhaps
realistic for eastern European conditions. Subtracting 3 milion kcal from the
production on account of seed and fertilizer (unfortunately, no details were given
either in the 1881 or in the 1899 versions), we obtain 15 million kcal/hr.yr.
Considering the use of land in Australia and in Prussia (Prussia had 17.25 million
hectares of arable land, 6.25 million hectares of pasture land, 8 million hectares
of forest, for a population of 26 million), about 19 million keal/yr would be
available per person.
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He went on to compute energy available from domestic animals. One horse in
one day can do work equivalent to 2 160 000 kilogrametres (this is not the
dietary intake but the equivalent of the mechanical work carried out). This
amounts to 1.5 million kcal/yr, counting about 300 days of work. Since there were
two million horses in Prussia, their work during one year would be equivalent to 3
trillion kcal, or some 115 400 kcal per person. There were many other domestic
animals, and using the equivalents one cow 0.66 horse 10 sheep 4 pigs = 12
goats, one could reckon that Prussia had the equivalent of 557 000 keal/yr per
person from domestic animals. Another point is that cows, pigs etc. are not for
work nor even primarily a source of food energy but rather a source of protein:
Sacher's analysis should have counted the energy made available as food (and not
as work) by all animals except horses. But this would have changed his accounts
very little. Whether in work or food energy, there is also a problem of double
counting, as the animals will feed on the pasture and will use the straw etc.
Sacher dealt later with this problem.
Sacher gave an unexplained estimate for energy from waterfalls, which "could
become a significant source of wealth" (p. 29), directly or in the form of
electricity. He considered coal; reckoning only 6000 kcal/kg, the amount of
energy available per person in Prussia would be 9 million kcal/yr, as annual
production in Prussia was 40 million tonnes of coal. Sacher was aware of the
difference between primary and useful energy, which for coal used in steam engines
would be very large.
According to Sacher, one should also reckon the chemical energy in the
metals produced, but he confessed that he did not know how to estimate this.
Finally, figures were given without explanation on the energy made available from
hunting and fishing. Sacher presented the information in Table 2.





From land 19 000
From domestic animals 557
From water power 36




However, Sacher considered that domestic animals consumed as food 15 times
the energy they delivered and therefore to avoid double counting one should
subtract 8.3 million kcal. Thus, some 20.3 million kcal per person/year remained
available. How was this energy used by society? Sacher discussed nutritional
needs, quoting Ruhlman, and gave as an example the diet of a German soldier at
war, concluding that at least a million kcal/yr per person would be needed as
food. However, adding the food wasted at different stages, one could estimate
minimum food energy use per person at 2 million keal/yr. The energy spent in
housing, clothing and other minimum necessities of life would perhaps amount to
1 million kcal more. The difference between the available 20 million kcal and the
3 million kcal of subsistence requirements could be used for all the amenities of
civilization, and to build machines for investment.
Sacher tried to correlate stages in cultural progress with energy
availability before Geddes and long before Henry Adams and Wilhelm Ostwald.
Podolinsky had wanted to correlate modes of production and energy availability,
but he did not do it in any of the versions of his article, and illness prevented
him from further work. Sacher was unaware of Podolinsky's work (though the
preface to his book is dated May 1881, one year after Podolinsky's article
appeared in the Revue Socialiate).
Sacher gave the following figures on energy available per person per year:
"savages", 3 million kcal; "nomads", 6 million kcal; "agriculturalists", 14
million kcal; contemporary central Europeans, 20.5 million kcal. While he had
discussed in some detail the figures corresponding to savages and central
Europeans, he did not give any explanation for the other two categories. The
figure for agriculturalists is way off the mark, in the sense that there is great
variation in this group of people. Research into human ecology many years after
Sacher (Hardesty, 1977; Ellen, 1982) shows that many agricultural peoples survive
and even give up a surplus to landowners or to the state with a lower level of
available energy. We would be reluctant to use the word "adapt" of functionalist
ecological anthropology and human ecology, as the history of the resistance of
many such peoples to exploitation is well known. In any case, consistency would
have demanded that Sacher subtract all the energy derived from coal from his
estimate for agriculturalists. Nevertheless, such criticisms are not wholly
relevant. Sacher not only developed this view of the stages of history, a clear
antecedent of evolutionary ecological anthropology, but also paid great attention
to how the surplus of energy, beyond the subsistence needs, was appropriated by
some groups of society to the exclusion of others. A large part of his books
(particularly that of 1899) is devoted to a discussion of the economics of
distribution, with an attack on interest, profit and rent.
Sacher went on to calculate the energy return to human energy input in
agriculture. For wheat agriculture he calculated a net energy balance. The net
energy output (including straw and net of seed and fertilizer) was 15 million
kcal/hr.yr. The human energy input (corresponding to 180 workdays at 450
kcal/hr.yr) was 81 000 kcal/ha.yr. Sacher did not consider the energy input from
dome8tic animals in this balance; he may have been thinking of a purely manual
agriculture. The ratio of energy output to human energy input is then 185.
The first requirement in comparative work in ecological anthropology is to
standardize the method of measuring human energy input. Sacher estimated not the
energy intake, but work done. The ratio of 185 still appears very high, but this
is because the energy output includes straw. It is a figure comparable to those
found in much modern work in ecological anthropology. Sacher explained that to do
work equivalent to 450 kcal/d workers have not only to be fed, but also clothed
and housed. Perhaps the minimum expenditure of energy per person would be 9000
kcal/d (this was a "savage" standard, in his view) converted into 450 kcal/d of
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effective work, with an efficiency of 1:20. Thus for every 20 kcal that the
agricultural worker, working on wheat cultivation, uses for food, clothing or
housing she or he delivers 185 kcal. In other words, "one person working on wheat
growing can feed nine other persons", a finding that Sacher later amended by
subtracting the energy value of the straw. In any case, Sacher was trying here to
explain that it was differences in the energy production of labour that caused
different countries to have different proportions of their populations in
agriculture. In England, the remarkably low proportion of population in
agriculture was due not only to food imports but also to the fact that "many
agricultural machines are used, therefore saving labour power, which is
substituted in part by the chemical energy of coal, in the steam plough" (p. 35).
This tantalizing remark shows that Sacher was on the brink of doing a
proper, comprehensive output-input analysis of energy flow in agriculture. He was
aware of fertilizers as part of the energy input. He almost expressed the view
that the high energy productivity of labour, in a country such as England, was
perhaps the consequence of the substitution of energy from stocks (of Chilean
nitrates and coal) for the flow of human and animal energy.
Sacher then tried to link energy analysis with the theory of economic value,
defining three types of value by energy. This is, we find, not a very useful part
of his analysis, but we include it for the sake of completeness. It would have
been more useful to pursue to the end his inkling that modern agriculture was
energy-intensive and to draw up a balance. Of course, an energy balance does not
distinguish between renewable energy and energy from stocks. A balance in money
would simply take prices and not consider whether such prices have really
incorporated the most peculiar judgements on the present value of future demand
for energy in stocks. We shall pick up these themes again in other chapters of
this report. The example of coal will clarify Sacher's definitions of his three
types of value. In Prussia, each miner produced on average 198 tonnes of coal per
year (Sacher, 1881, p. 59). If we assume the heavy daily work of a miner as equal
to 750 kcal with 300 workdays per year, then the total amount of work done per
year would be equivalent to 225 000 kcal. This would mean 1136 kcal per tonne of
coal, and this could be called the "exchange value" of a tonne of coal, on a human
energy theory of value. The "absolute value" of a tonne of coal -- that is, its
enthalpy, though Sacher did not use the word -- would be 6.5 million kcal. But
its "use value" would be much less because of various losses and especially
because of the low efficiency of the steam engine. The energy from a tonne of
coal that really could replace human labour would be only around 180 000 kcal.
Taking a house as an example, its exchange value would again be its human
energy cost; its use value would be the energy, not gained in this case, but
saved by living in the house, compared to the extra energy needed if its residents
lived in the open air. Similar considerations would apply to clothes.
Hypothetical figures were given by Sacher (1881, p. 74): in agriculture the
use value produced from a hectare of wheat would amount to 4.81 million kcal/yr
(with the yields that Sacher had assumed), once the production of straw had been
reduced fifteenfold because it was used as feed for animals and taking other
losses into account. The human energy input would be, as already explained, 81000
kcal/ha.yr, and this was the exchange value. The ratio between use value and
exchange value (4810/81 59) was given the curious name of "specific value"; it
is in fact the energy productivity of human labour.
The energetic efficiency of an agricultural worker (his or her "value as a
machine", as Sacher put it) would be of the order of 1:20, because one cannot
consider food energy only and because not everybody is available for work. Here,
Sacher's analysis becomes interesting again, because it states Podolinsky's
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principle. For an economy to be viable, the use values (i.e. energy gained or
saved) must be on average at least 20 times greater than exchange values (i.e.
human energy costs, measured as work done)(Sacher, 1881, p. 63). In other words,
the energy productivity of human work must be equal to or greater than the
efficiency of human beings as thermic machines. Agriculture fulfilled this
condition very amply, and so did coalmining, as the figures showed. Of course,
the viability of the reproduction of a socioeconomic system should include a time
perspective, and this Sacher did not discuss. Moreover, he was an "energetic
dogmatist", in Georgescu-Roegen's sense, that is, he did not consider the
availability of such resources as water or metals. He was nevertheless aware that
an energy theory of exchange value was not really tenable -- he devoted many
obscure pages to explaining why prices differed from such energy values, and he
mentioned explicitly that artistic work had value that could not be expressed by
its human energy cost.
The role of skill and innovations he considered to have importance in
economic development beyond their role in energy availability. Thus, from
Charlemagne, who had introduced new field rotations, to the inventors of the steen
engine, who had made coal useful for work, mental work had contributed to wealth,
and it could not be measured by energy cost. A corollary of this view was that it
was inappropriate to relate wages to the expenditure of human energy, as skill and
training played a great role in the value of human work.
With such provisos in mind he thought nevertheless that the "wealth of
nations" (1881, p. 77-78) was basically determined by the energy return for human
energy input. The higher the energy gained (or spared) -- "use value" -- and the
lower the human energy cost -- "exchange value" -- the more energy was available
beyond pure subsistence and the wealthier the nation. Whether this wealth was
permanent or transient was not discussed by Sacher who, unlike Podolinsky, did not
mention the second law.
As there were physical limits to the wealth of nations (despite the
important role of human skill and innovations), how this wealth was to be
distributed became a burning question. Chapters 7-14 of Sacher's first book, and
most of the second, are devoted to a discussion of theories of rent, interest and
profits. The real capitalists, however, were the plants that assimilated solar
energy (1881, p. 84), and Sacher was strongly antirentier and anticapitalist,
which might go some way to explaining the poor reception of his ideas in academic
circles, though not in the socialist or anarchist de.i-.onde. Podoliosky's and
Sacher's basic principle of human ecology reappears time and again, their initial
contributions having been ignored. Why were they forgotten? To point to the
separation between the natural and the social sciences is really to explain
nothing, because this separation itself needs explaining.
Although we are aware of the difference between the painstaking estimates of
energy and material flows by modern ecologists and the armchair counts of Sacher
and Podoliosky, we stress the continuity in method and the discontinuity in time
and intellectual tradition between their work and modern human ecology and
ecological anthropology. As for economic history, the first academically
successful attempt at this kind of approach was not made until Cipolla (1962).
BOUSSINGAULT, LIEBIG, GUANO AM) AGRARIAN CHEMISTRY
Technical progress has meant that agriculture, which had always been a
source of energy, is no longer one in every part of the world. Modern agriculture
transforms fossil energy into food. The nourishment of one average citizen of a
rich, peasant-less, meat-eating country now requires not less than one kilogram of
petroleum a day. The beginning of the change in agricultural practices (which
have increased harvests in those countries, while producing a spectacular decline
in the number of agricultural workers) came with mechanization and agrarian
chemistry.
The high energy intensity of modern agriculture derives not only from the
energy required to run the machines, but also from the manufacture of fertilizers,
herbicides and insecticides. Nitrogen fertilizers were first produced with
hydroelectricity at the end of the last century in Norway. The cycles of
nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium had been discovered only a few decades before.
Many economists thought that agrarian chemistry, understood as technical progress,
would reverse the tendency to decreasing returns or, to put it another way, would
shift the production function upwards.
The new agrarian chemistry was inaugurated in the 1840s by Boussingault
(1802-1887) in France and by Liebig (1803-1873) in Germany. Liebig liked to think
and say that his research was important to prevent a subsistence crisis in
Europe. The development of agrarian chemistry admits an externalist, sociological
interpretation of scientific and technical advances.
Liebig's basic idea was to change from an agriculture of spoliation to an
agriculture of restitution. He had to understand first that plants are nourished
by minerals. Liebig was the man who discovered the importance of phosphorus;
Boussingault was the one to analyze the nitrogen cycle, which Liebig did not
understand. Both of them analyzed Peruvian guano. Boussi.ngault explained that
Fourcroy and Vauquelin were the first to draw attention to the nature of guano,
and that the specimen they examined had been brought to Europe by Humboldt (1845,
p. 380). Mayer's article, Bemerkungen ueber die Kraefte der unbelebten
Natur (Observations concerning the forces of inanimate nature), which established
the mechanical equivalence of heat and the law of conservation of energy, was been
pi1ished in 1842, in the Annalen, edited by Liebig. The idea of a flow of energy
in agriculture had appeared in Mayer (1845), which Liebig had refused to accept.
What interested Liebig and Boussingault about guano wa8 its chemical composition;
neither studied the flow of energy in agriculture or costed the energy of
fertilizers, though Boussingault did research on nutrition and photosynthesis. To
defend the need to develop agrarian chemistry, they often remarked that guano
supplies would run out (and that Chilean saltpetre, which is nitrate of soda and
potassium, would not last either). Boussingault wrote according to the
calculations of Humboldt made clear that it would take three centuries to form a
layer no more than a centimeter thick of the excrement of those birds. An
astonishing time was necessary for layers 20 to 30 metres thick to accumulate.
Such layers existed until quite recently in many places, but the guano was
disappearing rapidly since it had become an object of commercial enterprise (1845,
p. 381).
The guano trade has been a favourite subject for Peruvian historians
(Bonilla, 1974) aiming to demonstrate the misdeeds of imperialism, which left Peru
without guano and having received little in exchange (the money from guano
remained in Europe to pay of I loans). There is another point of view: the
heteronomy of European agriculture from an energetic and material subsidy from
outside -- did it provoke no ecological argument similar to those of today? Did
no one say that the increase in productivity of European agriculture was the
reverse side of the exhaustion of resources and disruption to human lives in a
place as distant and desolate as the guano islands in the Humboldt stream? To
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avoid an agriculture of spoliation in Europe and to restore to the soil the
nutrients incorporated in plants, other territories were despoiled. An economic
history from a materialist and energetic standpoint would be required to complete
the research into financial transactions and the political struggles and failures
of an incipient Peruvian bourgeoisie with a calculation of that spoliation in
physical terms.
Students of agricultural economics still learn nowadays about Liebig's "law
of the minimum", nnely: no single element of the indispensable minerals is
superior to any other; all have equal value for the life of the plant.
Therefore, if one element is missing from the soil, the others cannot produce a
properly developed plant (1859, p. vi). The students are not taught his opinions
about the political economy of agriculture. Agriculturalists (he wrote) must not
rely on guano; its price was double what it had been before; no man with any sense
would want the production of his country to depend on the supply of a foreign
manure (op. cit., p. 269). It was therefore necessary to develop chemical
fertilizers, in spite of his pride in the fact that science (that is, Liebig
himself), "guided by a careful study of the elements of the food of plants",
pointed out in 1840 to the agriculturalists that guano was "one of the most
infallible means of raising the produce of corn and flesh, and most urgently
recommended its application" (op. cit., p. 265). One hundredweight (51 kg) of
guano contained the mineral elements necessary to produce between 25 and 30
hundredweight (1275-1530 kg) of wheat; this led to the belief that "the guano
beds of America" possessed an "immense value with reference to the production of
corn in Europe" and that guano would come to have a decisive role in the history
of Europe unless it were replaced in time: "bloody wars have sometimes sprung
from causes of much less importance" (op. cit., p. 269-270).
Liebig and Boussingault believed in replacement, perhaps because they were
chemists rather than physicists; the dissipation of matter is not an established
law of physics, whereas the degradation of energy is. However, they believed in
replacement not by hypothesis, like the economists who write production functions
with two or more inputs, but because they thought they would be able to
manufacture chemical fertilizers possessed of virtues similar to those of guano or
other manures that had always been known but whose chemical constituents they had
analyzed. They never said that, if the price of guano rose enough, there would
undoubtedly be an alternative fertilization technology (a backstop technology, in
today's economic terminology): they worked to develop that alternative. Neither
of them, however, drew attention to the fact that chemical fertilizers would be
made with energy from exhaustible fossil fuels.
Guano had been known as a fertilizer since before the Incas. Analysis of
its chemical composition and that of manures and human excrement and other
fertilizers known to agriculturalists laid the foundations of agrarian chemistry,
especially in Liebig's laboratory in Giessen. Liebig's nane can be associated
with a new leading sector of the chrematistic economy: the manufacture of
fertilizers. It can also be associated with a more ecologic vision, because he
developed an argument against latifundist agriculture and for a ruralized
urbanism. He wrote that when 2000 people live in one square mile (2.56 kni2), it
is impossible to export cereals and meat, as the produce of the land is just
enough to feed them. Also, all the mineral elements in the products consumed can
easily be returned without loss to the fields. But if this land falls into the
hands of big owners, spoliation will take the place of the system of restitution
and compensation. The small owner gives back to the land almost all he takes from
it; the big owner, on the other hand, sends the grain and the meat to be sold in
the major centres of consumption and so forfeits the conditions necessary to
reproduce them. Good luck brought guano, but guano would run out, and what would
we do then? (1859, pp. 229-231). Quoting Carey, he pointed out that in the
United States there were hundreds and thousands of kilometres between the
production centres of cereals and the markets; the result was that the soil was
becoming almost exhausted everywhere (op. cit., p. 20).
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At the same time, he praised the Chinese practice of fertilizing the fields
with human excrement and thought that the landowners of the great countries should
form societies to set up reservoirs where human and animal excrement could be
collected and prepared for transportation to the fields. (1859, p. 268). The
urban accumulation of excrement and refuse was the other side of the problem of
spoliation. From this, two clear lines of argument emerge: an ecological line
and a line of economic growth based on agrarian chemistry, sewers and the
treatment of urban refuse, which large-scale urbanization required.
Liebig's digressions on the recycling of excrement were considered either to
be rhetorical exaggeration or to refer to Chinese eccentricities. While most
natives of China were taking excrement to their own fields, some thousands of
them, held in debt peonage, were digging out bird excrements in Peru and sending
them on to Europe.1
What was appreciated about Liebig was the promise of an agriculture with
great yields, separated from the big cities and bsed on chemical fertilization.
That made him famous, which was much to his liking.L
The discussion about the substitution of industrial fertilizers for Chilean
nitrate came after Liebig. Chilean saltpetre was imported in great quantities;
for example, about 10 kg per person per year in Germany toward 1900 (far less than
the present imports of petroleum of about 4 kg per person per day). Boussingault
remarked early on that nitric acid came from nitrogen and oxygen and that to unite
these gases with an electric spark, the mixture must be moist, according to
Cavendish (1845, P. 323-324). Boussingault was still not envisaging the
practicality of industrial nitrogen fertilizers manufactured with electricity.
That discussion would come later, explicitly on the energy costs of substitution.
For example, there are detailed calculations of the kilowatt-hours necessary to
manufacture nitrogen in Popper-Lynkeus (1912) and especially in Jurisch (1908).
World War I gave it a great impetus, nitrogen being necessary for explosives, thus
fulfilling Joseph Henry's prediction 70 years earlier that one day the bolt of
Jove (electricity) would come to the aid of Mars, the god of war.
Soddy did refer to Cavendzsh's "great discovery of the 18th century". In
the Birkeland-Eyde proces8, instead "of the energy of a patient attendant turning
the handle of a frictional electric machine ... the power of hundreds of thousands
of horses, derived chiefly from the 'white fuel' of the Norwegian and Swiss
hillsides, are (sic) ceaselessly at work, turning dynamos which produce powerful
high-tension arcs in the air, so converting it partially into nitrous arid nitric
acids." As so many other British writers did after 1900, he referred to Sir
William Crooke's famous presidential address to the British Association for the
Advancement of Science, wherein he drew attention to the future failure of the
1 Liebig's opinions about the agriculture of China (and Japan) were formed under
the influence of the Prussian scientific missions, then investigating the
possibilities of colonies, in which the geographer Richthofen (1833-1905) later
participated.
2 The edition of his Letters on Modern Agriculture we have used announced the sale
of busts of the author. There is a book or, Liebig and English agriculture in
preparation by Vance D.M. Hall (cf., Centaurus, vol. 26, 1982-83, p. 232), to be
added to the excellent studies by Rossiter ano Krohn.
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wheat supply unless chemists solved the problem of the fixation of atmospheric
nitrogen. They had indeed succeeded (with the Haber process they were to succeed
further), but Soddy remarked that "the question, as to how long the Chile
saltpetre beds will last, has simply been merged into the more general problem of
how long the natural resources of energy of the globe will hold out. Insofar as
such developments utilize the natural energy running to waste, as in water power,
they may be accounted as pure gain. But insofar as they consume the fuel
resources of the globe they are very different. The one is like 8pending the
interest on a legacy, and the other is like spending the 1egacy itself. The wheat
problem ... is one particular aspect of a still hardly recognized coming energy
problem." Soddy therefore anticipated "a period of reflection in which awkward
interviews between civilisation and its banker are in prospect" (1912,
p. 135-139). The alarm about agricultural yields in the absence of chemical
fertilizers was as old as Liebig, if not as Humphry Davy, but the view that modern
agriculture was energy-intensive was still a novelty in 1912, and it surprisingly
remained a novelty until the 1970s.
PATRICK GEDOES'S CRITIQUE OF ECONOMICS
One early attempt at an ecological critique of economics was made by Patrick
Geddes, who was also one of the first authors to correlate human history and
expenditure of energy. This chapter will consider Geddes's early economic
writings, though Geddes is mainly known by his later work in which he insisted on
the need to carry out ecological studies of urbanization. To study a process
ecologically means to establish its energetic and material "budget", analyzing its
flow of energy and the cycles of materials.
Walras ond Geddes
Patrick Geddes, a Scot, born in 1854, died at Montpellier in 1932. He began
his scientific career studying biology with T.H. Huxley (1825-1895) in London. An
eye disease contracted during an expedition to Mexico and his own interest in
urban questions, first aroused in Edinburgh, led him to give up biology. In 1879
he had published an article entitled "Odorophylle animale et La physiologie des
planaires vertes, which indicated his familiarity from the beginning of his
career with the principles of the use of energy by plants and animals.
In 1884 he published two articles on economic topics. Later he made many
urbanistic plans, primarily in Scotland, England and India. His best known book
is Cities in Evolution (1915). In this chapter, our interest in Geddes is as one
of the first energy economists, and his wider significance for regional and urban
planning will not be considered in detail. His articles of 1884 on the economy
develop themes that may also be found, abridged, in his correspondence with Walras
(1834-1910), the founder with Jevons and Karl Menger of' marginalism.
One of Wairas's works had reached him through an economist (Foxwell of
Cambridge) whom Wairas used to expand the circle of adherents of the new
formalized marginalist economics. On 15 November 1883, Geddes thanked Walras for
the article and explained his objections to that form of economics. The
mathematical economists, he wrote, thought that "... they can do everything with
no assistance from applied physics for studies of material production, no
assistance from biology for the study of the organisms which make up society, with
no assistance from modern psychology (a very different thing from the psychology
of the old economists) or from the research done by the historical or
anthropological school!" The study of material production requires the assistance
of physics, but it is not necessary to agree with Geddes on the (dubious) benefit
to be gained from biology in studying the evolution of "social organisms". Geddes
that Walras make a distinction (discussing the application of mathematics to
economics) between statistics, the theory of exchange (termed pure catallactics by
Geddes) and studies of the material resources of a country or the conditions of
life of its inhabitants. The distinction between the theory of exchange and
studies of the use of resources is exactly the distinction between orthodox
economics and ecological institutionalist economics.
Geddes wrote also: "Another objection, it has always seemed to me that Mr.
Jevons, by wanting to apply mathematics to the study of utility, is failing to
recognize that this Utility is simply an abstraction which he has inherited from
the metaphysical school and not a true scientific fact or generalisation -- that
the Utility of a clock or of an opium pill is merely the "clockness" of the one
and the virtum dormitiva of the other. I do not deny that commodities are useful;
they are, certainly, just as the animals and the plants which I deal with are
alive, but I maintain that Utility is a rather unscientific abstraction, as
pernicious to real progress in political economy as Vitality has been in biology
and medicine." This is an objection to the commensurability of consumer goods in
economics.
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Wairas did not agree with these observations in his reply, but the
discussions went no further. Wairas hardly ever touched on physics except to
point out frequently the formal analogy shown in his equations between static
mechanical equilibrium and economic equilibrium. He had an interesting exchange
of letters with Herman Laurent (a specialist in actuarial calculus), who wanted to
know whether Wairas would agree that an invariable standard of' value would have to
be based on physical realities. Wairas did not want to know anything about an
invariable standard of' value. He repeated that value depended on supply and
demand (and that behind the function of demand, there was for each consumer a
function of utility, the value of which the consumer wished to maximize.)
Another of Wairas's correspondents was Winiarski, an author -- there were
several around the turn of the century -- who wrote both about "phychic" or
"mental" energy, as if that had anything to do with the energy of the physicists
and biologists and also about "utility" or "intensity of desire". This confusion
led him to say that Wairas's equations expressed exchanges of that mysterious
psychic energy. But we will leave Wairas and his correspondents and return to
Geddes.
Ruskin and Geddea
Geddes and Soddy were admirers of Unto This Last by John Ruskin (1819-1900),
a critique of conventional economics. The date of publication (1862) would have
allowed an ecological critique of economic theory. Ruskin also published in
1863 Mix*ra pulveria, a critique of economics as the study of transactions in the
market, pointing out that economics really should not mean the study of material
provisioning in human societies. It is not, however, an ecological critique with
accounting of energy and materials.
Ruskin criticized the aesthetic disasters of' industrial capitalism. He
rejected the idea that the market reflected the real needs that human beings had
in order to live surrounded by beauty. Therefore any accusation of physicalist
reductionism in the notions of need that are to be found in Geddes (and Soddy) is
misplaced. To think that the admirers of Ruskin had seriously proposed replacing
economic -- or rather chrematistic -- calculus with energy accounting and nothing
else would be absurd. Energy accounting serves as a critique of money accounting
(inasmuch as it questions how the value of inputs and products should be
measured). Energetic calculus does not classify economic questions; it
complicates them, It is in no way a theory of value, but a contribution to the
critique of theories of value.
In John Ruskin, economist (1884), Geddes wrote that to say that a loaf of
bread or a diamond has no value beyond its utility is to say no more than that
these phenomena share the idealistic aspect attributable to all phenomena. When
economists say things have only utility value, they merely express the
indisputable fact that from that idealistic point of view they have no other
aspect. We should leave the academics in their cloisters and walk out into the
world, look around us and try to see the loaf and the diamonds objectively. We
shall find that they have various physical and physiological properties; bread is
a quantity of fuel and its heat-giving power can be measured in units of energy of
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work; the diamond is a sensory stimulus, which varies according to Fechner's Law.1
We can easily understand what Ruskin was trying to explain, however ridiculous it
may seem to orthodox economists: intrinsic value is the absolute power of
something to support life. An ear of corn has a certain value for sustaining the
body, a litre of air has a certain power to maintain the body's temperature and a
bunch of flowers has the power, through its beauty, to animate the senses and the
heart.
Geddes paid tribute to Stanley Jevons for having seen truths that his
contemporaries either could or would not see, such as the waste of Britain's coal
reserves. According to Geddes, Jevons had argued that coal was not merely an
article with a subjective value and consequently a subjective exchange value; it
represented a quantity of stored energy that imposed strict and calculable limits
on industrial activity. The economics of coal, therefore, was not a question of
increasing the wealth of the mine owners, as Ricardo would have explained with his
theory of differential rent; nor was it a question of raising miners' wages, as
union economists would say (not that there were many such economists). The
question was the relation between reserves and present and future demand and a
careful study of that demand; it was prevention of waste of energy, and stopping
the spread of soot. Businessmen and their academic supporters, the market
economists, with their advocacy of laissez-faire , were exactly opposed to
Ruskin's views.
In Geddes's view, Ruskin was the legitimate heir of the physiocrats and,
with the aid of the physical and biological sciences, the precursor of their
rehabilitation. Moreover, by expressing the aims of practical economics as the
improvement of the quality of life, by treating art criticism and other aspects of
production from this point of view and by stressing the essential unity of
economics and morality and not their discrepancy (assumed by other economists),
Ruskin became a classic.
Although Ruskin is not a classic of economics, this appraisal is significant
to the understanding of Geddes's critical program of research on economics,
ecologic on the one hand and moral and aesthetic on the other. In 1884 he also
published Analysis of the Principles of Economics, papers he read to the Royal
Society of Edinburgh (whose secretary was Peter Guthrie Tait), which amount to
some 40 pages in which he developed ideas presented three years before in The
Classification of Statistics. In the chapter on physical principles he wrote:
"Without ignoring the historic services of the physiocratic school, the
application of the conceptions of modern physics to economics may be fairly said
to date from Professor Tait's discussion of the Sources of Energy in Nature,
published about twenty years ago ... The subject has been developed to some extent
1 Geddes's quotation of Fechner implies that one could measure in some way the
"sensory stimulus" given by diamonds. Fechner (1801-1887) was the founder of
psychophysics, and he proposed a law that relates stimulus and sensation (as in
the logarithmic relation between noise, measured in decibels, and sensation). Max
Weber in 1908, in his campaign for separation between the sciences, was rightly to
deny any possibility of basing marginal utility theory on this fundamental
psychophysical law.
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by other physicists, as Siemens, Thomson etc., but seldom by ?conomists, with the
distinguished exception of Professor Stanley Jevons" (p. 952).
Geddes proposed an input-output table, certainly inspired by the Tshleau
Econo.ique. The first column contains the usable sources of energy (according to
Tait's classification) as well as the sources of materials used not for their
potential energy, but for their other properties, which shows that Geddes was not
a believer in the "energetic dogma". This energy and these materials are
transformed into products in three stages: extraction of fuels and raw materials,
manufacture and transport and exchange. The intermediate products used for the
manufacture of the final products must be subtracted from the final products. It
is also necessary to estimate the losses (dissipation and disintegration) at each
stage.
It was legitimate to apply to the economy the concepts of physics that
measure matter and energy. A quantity of matter is exploited -- let us say, x
units; so much is lost at each stage of production (a+b+c), and the final product
remaining is [x - (a+b+c)]. Part of this will be available for recycling, after
consumption, as scrap. Moreover, so many units of energy, x, are exploited; the
processes of extraction, transport and so on cost so many units, a; the remainder
(x - a) is the available energy. The difference passes to the manufacturer; the
material and energy wasted by him are shown in the same way; the remainder, after
a deduction for losses incurred in transport, is the quantity of final product,
which could be separated into a permanent and a transitory part (for immediate
consumption).
It was possible to express the work done by human beings in units; from a
physical point of view they were thermic machines (automata, said Geddes). The
horsepower of a machine could equally well be called "manpower", and vice-versa.
To talk of horsepower was, in fact, pure convention. Producers and machines were
not only interchangeable but commensurable.
The quantity of energy and materials exploited during a given time and the
part disintegrated or dissipated during the process were shown in the diagrams
with which Geddes explained his ideas. The amount of final product seemed
incredibly small in proportion to the potential amount. This disparity was
intended to show the enormous losses of energy and material, which often exceeded
by many times the final product, because of the imperfection of our processes.
These lo8ses of energy or matter were included in Geddes's accounting scheme. In
conventional economics they were excluded; what was being paid for at each stage
was not the energy and matter lost, but only that available for that stage. For
example, the energy from the coal that moves machines is accounted for in money,
but not the other 90-97% which is dissipated. The final product, what would today
be called added value, was not added value at all; it was the value remaining from
the energy materials available at the beginning.
1 The material by Tait to which Geddes refers, published in the North British
Review (vol. XL, 1864, pp. 40 and 337), which was a review of literary criticism,
is a thorough history of the discovery of the laws of energetics from Fourier
(1768-1830), Rumford (1753-1814) and Sadi Carnot (1796-1832) to Clausius
(1822-1888) and William Thomson (1824-1907), where Joule (1818-1889) is given high
praise and Mayer (1814-1878) is ignored. It includes a classification of the
sources of energy available for the production of mechanical labour (p. 364):
fossil fuels, animal fodder, power from flowing water, tides, winds, ocean
currents, volcanos and qeothermic water, and explains the physical origin of each
of these energy sources. The idea that it is possible to do energy accounting of
economic processes is implicit (for example, in comparing the thermodynamic
efficiency of steam engines and the human body, p. 344), but it is not developed.
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The part of the final product that took the form of capital. (or productive
apparatus, as Geddes called it) could easily be expressed in physical units; the
part however for consumption consisted of matter and energy. Certainly, if we
considered consumers as auta.ata, their maintenance needs could be expressed in
physical terms, but we could rt explain human consumption without introducing
psychological and social considerations. Geddes observed great disparities in
consumption. For example, the Russians', Norwegians' and Scots' consumption in
monetary terms was respectively £7, £14 and £30 sterling per person per year. How
could the huge difference be explained, given similar geographic conditions and
similar needs for food and fuel? We must divide consumption into "necessary" and
"super-necessary": the variation in super-necessary consumption may be called the
esthetic element, and final products could be analyzed in terms of their necessary
and aesthetic elements. The paradoxical conclusion thus arrived at is that
although production was fundamentally for maintenance, it was principally for art,
a conclusion that fits in with his eulogies of Ruskin; obviously it is absurd to
classify Geddes among the supporters of a theory of energy-value.
An ecological critique of industrial urbanization
Geddes's ideas on cities are well known, especially through the work of
Mumford, although they are less original as ecological critiques of economies than
the articles of 1884. As far as we know, he never analyzed the flow of energy of
a specific city; nonetheless that was the idea he had in mind and any urbanist who
read his work could have begun the task many years ago. Cities have always lived
off the energy (and materials) supplied by the countryside as cereals and other
foods. Today's great cities are characterized by the size of this absorption,
considerably aided by modern transportation (which is, to a great extent, the
result of chrematistically cheap energy).
Geddes's thoughts on urbanism, however, have a different starting point:
cities on top of coalfields. The map of population in Great Britain changed with
the inception of coal-based industrialization. But not only had the cities near
coal deposits grown; others -- especially London -- also grew enormously into
conurbations. Coal made this possible. This development had taken place against
a belief in industrial progress based on unlimited supplies of coal; the
objections of Carlyle, Ruskin and Morris were dismissed as "romantic" or
"aesthetic". Their ideas were however in accord with those of the physicists.
Geddes was fond of bringing the assuned certainties of the "hard" sciences
(including a doubtful biology of human group8) to bear upon the woollymindedness
of the economists. The fact is, however, that the physicists were in general
enthusiastic about industrialization and urbanization. This does not detract from
Geddes's conclusion, that there should be no confusion between the development of
resources and the dissipation of energy. Such dissipation might produce
extraordinary wealth in money, but what did it really mean? An improvement in the
quality of life? The new type of economist would want to preserve real wealth by
planting trees, for example, to replace those cut down: the forest is a bank
where real wealth grows. Geddes was exercising here the leitaotif of ecological
economics: plants as the real capitalists, the economists' confusion between
wealth and debt. He introduced also the distinction between "paleotechnical" or
coal-based industrialization and urbanization and "neotechnical", but he did not
specify the technologies of this neotechnical era (compared, for instance, to
Popper-Lynkeus's detailed quantitative analysis) other than eulogizing the
integration of cities with agriculture and offering optimistic visions concerning
electricity (a renewable source of energy only when produced from waterpower).
The new neotechnical urbanism would create Utopias; the old conurbations were
really Kakotopias. Geddes's analysis of the evolution of cities is nearer a true
human ecology based on the careful tracing out of the flows of energy and
materials than the misnamed "human ecology" of the Chicago urban sociology of
Park, Burgess and Hawley in the 1920s (Naredo et al., 1979). However, there was
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rio systematic quantitative comparison of the energy intensity of different
patterns of urbanization, that is, of the calories or kilowatt-hours per
inhabitant that would have to be brought from outside for the city to function.
In later urban analyses and planning (for instance, by Lewis Mumford) such
comparisons are still missing. In Le Corbusier, the very idea of the relevance of
ecological analysis disappeared. Perhaps one of these days, going full circle, we
shall read an apology for the great city as a true apotheosis of autopoiesis,
organizing, cajoling and extracting energy and materials from territories near or
remote.
MAX WEBER'S CRITIQUE OF WILHELM OSTWALD
One of the few natural scientists who wrote on social energetics and had
some impact on one of the social sciences (cultural anthropology) was Wilhelm
Ostwald (1853-1932). He developed the view that human history was linked to
greater availability of energy and an improvement in the efficiency with which it
could be transformed. He wrote books along these lines, one of which foreshadowed
modern evolutionist ecological anthropology, as Leslie White cane to realize.
Weber held views on economic history that were similar, as we shall see, to those
propounded almost simultaneously by Soddy, who was 25 years younger, and which had
also been propounded by Podolinsky, Sacher and Geddes in the 1880s and by
Pfaundler (with whom Ostwald was in contact) in 1902. Ostwald quoted none of
them.
Ostwald's views on economic history were based on an energeticist critique
of economic theory. But they were not strictly dependent on his energeticist
viewpoint in physics and chemistry, which denied the relevance of atomism both
before its experimental stage and for some years after the discovery of
radioactivity. Soddy had been speculating since 1903 on the potential of atomic
energy in the economy. In any case, we shall not be dealing with Ostwald's
energeticism in the natural sciences (in the sense in which this word was used at
the time), but with his energeticism in human history.
Ostwald had a talent for advertising his wares. He coined a slogan -- which
he described as an energetiactie Iuperativ, to be used not only as a moral guide
but also as a principle of interpretation of the course of human history --
Vergeude keine Energie, verwerte Sie (Waste no energy; value it). One could see
in it one of the origins of the theories that link natural selection and the use
of energy (from lotka to Prigogine) and that, when applied not to different
species, but to humankind, may link energy analysis and socialdarwinism. Ostwald
himself did not develop this line of thought -- how societies adapt to the
available flow of energy and how they modify it -- and he did not do any empirical
analysis of the use of energy in any society.
Max Weber (1864-1920), who wrote a review of Ostwald's 1909 Energetic
foundations of the science of culture and published it also in 1909 (Weber, 1968)
rightly criticized Ostwald for his failure to provide data. But he did not quote
any of the authors (from Podolinsky to Pfaundler, apart from others that we might
have missed in our research) who had done empirical work on the flow of energy in
human societies. Max Weber explained Ostwald's main thesis and defended the
separation between the sciences, almost making fun of Ostwald's 8alto ortale into
economic history. Weber could certainly have been more cruel in his critique. He
reserved his fiercest irony for Solvay, the industrialist who had also written on
energy and society, and he did not dwell, excessively on Ostwald's nonsense on
"mental" energy or on such flights of fancy as Ostwald's proposal for a universal
language to save the energy spent on translations.
The development of culture, Ostwald had said, depended on the availability
of energy and the efficiency of its transformations. Max Weber's first points
were that Ostwald did not provide detailed figures and that he forgot about the
availability of materials. Weber thus anticipated Georgescu-Roegen's strictures
against the "energetic dogma". Ostwald started from the fact that almost
everything that happened on the Earth took place because of the energy radiated by
the sun. Therefore, a permanent, viable economy ought to be based exclusively on
solar radiation. Ostwald had written, however, that the rapid expenditure of
solar energy, converted and stocked as coal, was of little importance. How could
the squandering of such an inheritance be of little importance? asked Weber. The
answer, according to Ostwald, was that the efficiency of the transformation of
solar radiation was capable of enormous improvement not 80 much because of an
increase in the photosynthetic yield of plants, as because of the direct
industrial application of solar energy through photovoltaic conversion.
Perhaps Ostwald was right in this view, but why did he not analyze the
reserves of iron, and of the copper and zinc so important for the transmission of
electricity? Ostwald foresaw that future energy supplies would come from solar
energy converted into chemical and electric energy. Accordingly, it would have
been useful to consider to what extent aluminium (which, Weber wrote, was
practically inexhaustible and was falling rapidly and consistently in cost) could
replace copper and zinc. To sum up: Ostwald did not believe that the flow of
solar energy either had or would decrease; so there was be no need to economize on
energy from the sun, although the availability of materials, some of which were
required for the transmission of energy itself, needed consideration. The law of
entropy -- of dissipation through use -- wrote Weber, applied to materials as much
as to energy.
Moreover, if the prospects for the industrial use of solar energy, which up
to now had been used only through live or fossil plants, were as good as Ostwald
preached, why should we worry about the efficiency of the transformation of
energy? Was thermodynsmic efficiency not increasingly irrelevant, also taking
into account that birth rates were falling?
Ostwald defined cultural progress as the increase in the availability of
energy and the substitution of human energy by alternative forms. He had defined
cultural progress also as an increasingly efficient energy use. Was not Ostwald
contradicting himself? Max Weber pointed out that a peice of cloth woven by
machine must have a higher energy cost than a piece of cloth ven by hand, yet
nobody could doubt that weaving by machine represented technical and cultural
progress. In any case, price and cost made weaving by machine advisable. The
study of prices and costs was the province of economics; energetics was
irrelevant.
About the first Ostwaldian criterion for cultural progress -- the increase
in the availability of energy and the relative decrease in the use of human energy
-- Weber had little to say beyond a reminder of Sombart's arguments in his
discussion of Reuleaux's concept of "machine". Weber also remarked that between
classical antiquity and the present there had been a great decrease in the
relative importance of human energy. Therefore there had been cultural progress
if one defined it tautologically in this way. Paraphrasing Weber, we could say
that Qstwald could have saved himself some embarrassment by avoiding the use of
the word "culture", since his energetic definitions would make Austin, Texas in
the second half of the twentieth century a more "cultured" city than Florence in
the Renaissance. We can only agree with Weber's critique of the energetic
definition of "culture", but it is a pity that it distracted him from the useful
question: do we gain any better understanding of human history, and particularly
of economic history, by studying the changes in the flow of' energy in human
societies?
The second Ostwaldian criterion of cultural progress -- the improvement in
the thermodynamic efficiency of energy use -- was, for Weber, even more absurd.
Although each generation of steam engines certainly improved efficiency,
industrial processes that tend to decrease rather than increase thermodynamic
efficiency are, nevertheless, often described as technical progress. For
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instance, wrote Weber, if we calculate the energy radiated by the sun and
contained in coal used for each unit of machine-woven textiles, and if we draw up
a similar account for hand weaving, we would find that energetic efficiency was
greater in hand weaving than in machine weaving, that the energy unit cost was
lower in pre-industrial processes.
In an exchange economy, however, the relation between money unit costs,
which were decisive in competition, did not necessarily parallel the relation
between energy unit costs, though of course -- wrote Weber with a amile -- the
energy spent would always have an "energetic" influence in money costs. For
instance, if Ostwald was right in saying that a device could, be introduced to
convert solar radiation into electric energy, it was clearly possible that, even
if its thermodynamic efficiency was much inferior to that of a steam engine, the
competitive edge of this form of energy would be overwhelming. In fact, the most
primitive tool in nature, human muscle, was more efficient in the use of the
energy than the best electric dynamo, and yet it lost out in the economic
comparison.
Neither Max Weber nor Ostwald considered how the prices of exhaustible
resources are determined. Weaving by hand was more expensive than weaving by
machine because the steam engine had been invented and coal was cheap. Why was
coal cheap? If the answer was the abundance of supply, we would have to look at
the allocation of coal over time. How was future demand valued at present? Weber
did not go into this question. Insofar as he was an economic historian (although
not, perhaps fortunately, a pure economic theorist) he should have gone into it to
see whether he could clinch his argument. For instance, with the benefit of
hindsight we can say that the internal combustion engine gained a competitive edge
in some parts of the world at a certain time because oil was cheap owing to
abundant supply and low extraction costs. But to understand why the supply of oil
was considered abundant relative to demand one has to consider a permutation of
beliefs and attitudes: that future discoveries would be equal to or higher than
use at that time; that, if oil ran out, it would be replaced by something else;
that the demand of future generations could be discounted; that the demand of the
poor sections of humankind could be ignored. Even the neoclassical economics of
slavery has to embrace study of the demography of those slaves; the economics of
natural resources has to embrace study of the reproduction of such resources.
Only the most fanatic of methodological individualists, who really believed that
the physical characteristics of commodities did not matter at all, could argue
that, because a natural resource is cheap, it must be abundant.
Steam engines, at the time Weber was writing, had efficiencies as low as 5
per cent, whilst the human body can convert food energy into work with an
efficiency of 20 per cent. Even today, if we take into account that a power
station will dissipate two-thirds of the energy of coal or oil, and if we also
take into account the energy cost of extraction and transportation of coal or oil
and the losses in the transmission of electricity, it might turn out that work
done with an electric engine is energetically less efficient than if done by human
power.
However, it is obvious that the amount of work done nowadays in an
industrial economy could not be done with human and animal power. This was indeed
one of Ostwald's points: greater availability of energy and a concomitant
decrease in the share of human energy were signs of cultural progress. In
societies with a generalized market system, the substitution of new forms of
energy for human and animal energy has been brought about because work done with
machines powered by coal, oil etc. is cheaper. But the price of coal or oil and
the market-led allocation of resources incorporate forecasts of technical change
and ethical judgements on the conservation of such exhaustible resources for
future generations. Prices and costs are firmly embedded in the interpretation of
physical reality that economic agents take from the history of science and
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technology, and in the social distribution of moral values concerning the demands
of future generations. A greater (or lesser) weight given to future needs or a
less (or more) optimistic view of technical change could have pushed up (or down)
the price of coal or oil, and so changed the relations between costs that Max
Weber thought decisive for an explanation of economic history. Max Weber's
economics, in this particular piece of writing, should be called chrematistics or
catallactics -- the study of individual transactions, from which a pattern of
prices anad quantities emerges independently of the social causes of the
valuations that are made.
FREDERICK S000Y'S CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
The ecological critique questions the definitions of the terms of economic
discourse, such as "production". To that extent, it has always been destructive
of theories of economic growth, though this does not mean that the early
ecologists were technologic pessimists.
One persistent critic of economic theory who could not always be called a
technological pessimist was Frederick Soddy (1877-1956). He worked with
Rutherford on his early atomic research in Montreal and subsequently at Scottish
universities. He discovered and named the isotopes, and won the Nobel Prize for
chemistry in 1921. In 1919 he returned to Oxford as professor of chemistry, on
his second attempt to secure a chair at the university where he had been an
undergraduate. Neither the scientists nor the economists paid any attention to
his economic doctrines, and he remains an unknown name even among the economists
of his old university, despite the recent articles by Trenn (1979) and Daly
(1980).
From 1903 onward Soddy believed that energy from atoms could change the
economic prospects of mankind, though he was doubtful about developing the
technology for accelerating the fission of' the self-splitting atom.
He gave the title Cartesian Economics to the lectures delivered to the
London School of Economics and Birkbeck College students in 1921 to emphasize that
his critique was based not on romantic gloom about the technological prospects,
but on a rationalist approach. We, on our side, emphasize the title he gave to
his lectures, as it is now the fashion to set "ecological thought" in opposition
to the scientific method and to analytical thought (for instance, in the work of
the Californian mystic Fritjof Capra, 1982), a fashion much favoured by the
irrationalist philosophies of science prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s (cf.
Newton-Smith, 1982).
In those lectures, Soddy took issue directly with Keynes's views on
long-term growth. Soddy defined wealth as a flow, which could not be saved, only
spent. Real wealth came only from the flow of energy from the sun, which was
consuned as it arrived and could not be stocked. Part of this wealth took the
form of so-called capital goods and was carefully measured as financial capital --
as credits against the community. Real wealth, in the form of a wheat crop, for
instance, would rot if stored for any time, whereas wealth in the form of
so-called capital goods, registered as financial capital, was supposed not to rot
but to grow independently at compound interest ad infinitia. This was a
convention of human society, subject to contingent ethical values. Such values
could indeed be historically variable, but they could not run permanently counter
to the principles of thermodynamics. One could readily agree that a chauffeur had
a spiritual life that transcended the mechanism of his car, but if his spirit
should move him to try to run the car on fuel already spent, we would consider him
an ass.
The economists were victims of this delusion. Keynes seemed to believe that
wealth -- and not debt -- increased according to the rules of compound interest, a
"fact" he opposed to the Maithusian population "law". He had written that one
geometric progression could overcome another; the nineteenth century had been
able to forget the fertility of the human species because of the dizzy virtues of
compound interest. Capital, according to Keynes, was something like a cake that
one day, thanks to compound interest, would be large enough to satisfy everybody,
unless prematurely consuned in war. Once the stock of capital had increased
sufficiently, excessive work, overcrowding and hunger would disappear, and mankind
would devote itself to the exercise of its nobler faculties. Now we all know,
remarked Soddy, that we cannot have our cake and eat it. Capital could not really
be stored. It was subject to a law of continuous decrement, because physically it
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was energy embodied in certain objects, subject to the law of entropy. Neither
physiocrats, orthodox economists nor marxist economists had a relevant answer to
the basic question: how does mankind live? The answer was, "by sunshine".
Without the sun the world would be lifeless not only because there would be no
plants and animals, but also because even inanimate nature would stand still. The
volcanoes would still erupt, the tides would ebb and flow in dead oceans, the
newly discovered phenomena of radioactivity would persist, but there would be no
rain and no wind. The starting point of economics should be the first and second
laws of thermodynamics. Soddy did not pay attention to exhaustible resources
other than fossil fuels and radioactive materials. Yet he was not a partisan of
an energy theory of values, being extremely conscious of the difficulties in
defining the objectives of human life. He stated explicitly that he did not
understand the proposals to substitute a system of "energy certificates" for the
price system (1926, p. iv, cf. Chapman, 1975). In the unlikely event that he had
been surrounded by economists converted to ecological reductionism, he would
certainly have quoted Ruskin's eulogy of aesthetic objectives of economic
activity.
Although life followed the principles of the steam engine for its physical
preservation, it was also "the expression of the interaction of two totally
distinct things represented by probability of free will" (1922, p. 6). The
natural sciences dealt with the phenomena of probability; there was room for
sciences of intelligence and free will. Economists needed to understand the laws
of physics, but they also had to grasp the effect that the intelligent behaviour
of humanity could have on the physical world. The biological and human sciences
had to study the equivalent of Maxwell's demons. It was the capacity of using
energy externally, and not only like other plants or animals internally, that made
necessary a specific economic science, which could not be reduced to natural
sciences. Soddy's distinction between the vital and laboral uses of energy was
introduced in his 1921 lectures; it is similar to that of Lotka, so often quoted,
between the endosomatic and the exosornatic uses of energy.
Vital use refers to photosynthesis in plants and carbon oxidation in animal
and human nutrition. Animals and humans cannot use solar energy directly (except
to warm themselves); they have no chlorophyll. Laboral use means the use by
humankind of instruments moved by wind, waterfalls, steam or internal combustion
engines etc. Such external uses of energy can also have recreative purposes, and
this is why Lotka's distinction between endosomatic and exosomatic uses of energy
is more comprehensive than Soddy's.
Soddy pointed out that, although the vital use of energy could not vary much
from person to person, the laboral use varied enormously from one person, one
country and one historical period to another. This is something noticed from the
beginning of ecological economics by Podolineky, Sacher and Geddes; it is a
characteristic of humankind. There was a change in the nineteenth century in that
previously the flow of solar energy had been exploited for vital and laboral uses,
whereas now a stock was being used for laboral purposes. "Wind power, water power
and wood fuel are parts of the year-to-year revenue of sunshine no less than
cereals and other animal foods. But when coal became king, the sunlight of a
hundred million years added itself to that of today and by it was built a
civilisation such as the world had never seen" (1922, p. 20). The fundamental
feature of this civilization, however, was that the internal combustion of the
human body could not directly be fed by fossil fuels but only by vegetables,
either directly or indirectly in the form of animal products. One could certainly
use water power or fossil fuels to make electricity and manufacture nitrogenous
fertilizer, which would increase crops, but the penultimate step must always be
the storage of energy by plants. Photosynthesis marked the true limits of human
welfare on the Earth.
Britain had been able, to exchange commodities made with the energy stored in
fossil fuels for food from other territories: by this process "the whole world
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gradually drew more and more for its labour-use on the capital energy of fuel, and
used it to widen the area under cultivation and to transport the harvests from the
most distant regions of the world and so indirectly augmented the revenue of
sunshine upon which it is still entirely dependent for its life-use" (1922, p.
11). This shortlived phase could be prolonged by imperialism, but nothing could
change the fundamental fact that the use of coal (or oil) meant using capital
instead of revenue, and coal (or oil) could only be used indirectly to sustain
life. Thus there arose the paradox that capitalism was not capitalist as regards
the means of livelihood. It was, to coin a word "revenual" -- which helped to
explain the resilience of peasant farming, which was able to retreat into
subsistence by giving up the use of capital.
It was absurd, however, to talk of an "accumulation" of capital. The
capital stored in coal was spent, not accumulated. The flow of energy from the
sun "may be embodied in some concrete commodity, in food which rots, in houses
which fall into desuetude if not kept permanently under repair, and in all the
tangible assets of our civilisation, in railroads, roads and public works,
factories, wharves, shipping and the like. All alike are subject to a process of
compound decrement ... The wealth is the revenue and it cannot be saved" (1922,
p. 14). The individual, however, although he will rarely have enough real wealth
to keep alive for a single week, can store not wealth but currency -- "whether a
cowrie stone or a mental counter, but now, more and more, a simple paper note" --
and the community acknowledges the right of the holders of such tokens, who do not
create real wealth, to indent on the revenue of wealth flowing through the markets
at any given moment. The more wealth is spent, the greater the total amount of
indebtedness, which becomes, as Ruskin said, "power over the lives and labours of
others" (1922, p. 15).
It could be said in answer to Soddy that in economic accounting, the part of
capital goods that depreciates yearly is subtracted from production. Thus, the
gross national product (GNP) include8 all investment, and only a part of it will
be counted as net investment, the rest being amortized and subtracted from CNP to
get net production. Soddy's strictures seem out of place, unless one recalls that
the national accounts do not include any provision (or only a minimal one) for the
depletion of natural resources, on the accounting convention that the discovery of
new reserves compensates for the expenditure of that "capital", which is therefore
not amortized.
Work on Soddy's economic thought would be incomplete if we did not deal with
his view that the distinction between the vital and the laboral use of energy
would lose importance if enough energy were available to produce synthetic food.
What were the prospects for a great increase in the availability of energy? "The
extraordinary developments since the beginning of the century in the study of
radioactivity and of the internal structure of the atom have proved that there is
resident in ordinary materials amounts of energy of the order of one million times
that which can be obtained from fuel during combustion, but to liberate this
store the transmutation of the elements one into another must be first made
possible" (1922, p. 22). The decisive factor was knowledge; humanity has shivered
for thousands of years on top of coalmines and nearly died of hunger next to the
Niagara that now produced more food through fertilizers. It was true that the
future of civilization depended on the summer holidays of university teachers, who
then had a few weeks for uninterrupted research. Soddy, it must be said, spent
his research time on economics instead of trying to split the atom, and his role
in nuclear physics, comparable in importance to that of Rutherford up to 1920
(cf. Trenn, 1977), was negligible afterwards. It would be wrong, however, to say
that his interest in the economy arose only in going back to Oxford: he had from
the beginning of his career noticed the connection between the economy and the
availability of energy.
Soddy believed in scientific progress, but he did not believe that it was
synonymous with technical progress. He realized at the turn of the century how
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the newly discovered source of energy could change history, but he thought all his
life that warlike applications were more likely than peaceful ones. He asked
himself what would be "the effect of the discovery that, so far, we have been
subsisting on the mere by-products of natural energy, and have remained ignorant
even of the existence of the primary supplies in the atoms of matter" (1912,
p. 240). The effect was likely to be destructive. H.G. Wells used Soddy's
warnings to anticipate not only the industrial employment of atomic energy but
also a universal atomic war. In 1917 Soddy wrote that if hiinanity succeeded in
controlling this aspect of nature, war would probably cease to be an interminable
agony because a section of the world, or the whole world if necessary, could be
swiftly and effectively stripped of its population (Freedman, 1979, p. 259; Trenn,
1979, p. 267). His early alarm at the destructive possibilities of nuclear energy
was not shared by other scientists. Millikan, for example, himself a Nobel Prize
winner and head of Caltech, openly ridiculed it (Sinsheliner, 1978). Years later,
in 1947, when Soddy was 70, he gave a lecture in which he detailed the discoveries
of atomic theory, from Becquerel, Röntgen and J.J. Thomson between 1895 and 1897
to Otto Hahn in 1939. There was a double achievement -- "both the sudden
liberation of a sensible part of the atomic energy of uraniun by the atomic bomb,
and the controlled release by the uranium pile" -- the graphite-moderated
reactor. "Of the effectiveness of the former for destruction the facts speak for
themselves": more deaths from a single atomic bomb than from all the air-raids in
England during the war. On the other hand, he was far from hopeful that atomic
energy could have peacetime applications for two reasons -- the "poisoning" of the
reactor, which shortened its life, and "the virtual impossibility of preventing
the use of the non-fission products of the pile, such as plutonium, for war
purposes" (1947, pp. 10-12).
He had long wanted to discover why science had proved at least as much a
curse as a blessing, in view of the contingency, which had seemed remote but was
now immediate, that the powers of destruction might suddenly be increased a
millionfold. This line brought him to the idea that "all history could be strung
on the one thread, the growing power of men to control and use the energy of
nature to supplement their own relatively puny strength" (1947, p. 12). Soddy was
not in the habit of observing scholarly conventions in his economic writings; he
did not quote either Podolinsky or Sacher (whom he did not know), or Patrick
Geddes, or indeed Ostwald, whom he certainly knew. It is likely that Soddy
independently made the connection between energy availability and the course of
hunan history, more or less at the same time as Ostwald but stimulated by his work
on radioactivity (which was quite alien to Ostwald's outlook in chemistry and
physics).
Be that as it may, by 1947 Soddy could complain of a double frustration of'
science: the technological benefits of scientific work were not made available to
hunankind at large because the economic system made for unequal distribution;
moreover, some of the developsents of scientific discoveries could not be more
appalling. The destructive power of atomic energy was already here: "we [should]
wait for the natural orderly growth of technology to harness in due course the new
source of power, rather than feverishly attempting to cook the hare before
catching it", and "rather than starting our engineers on a wild-goose chase
elaborately cracking peanuts with steam-hammers, for purely political
window-dressing as yet another carrot to keep the masses hopefully jogging along,
it would be better to concentrate for a while on the purely research side" (1947,
p. 12).
In politics he apparently had no friends. Although he sometimes praised
Marx, he was opposed to Soviet communism. In his lecture in 1947, he supported
Bertrand Russell's proposal for the U.S. to prevent, by force if need be, the
atomic armnent of the Soviet Union. He died in 1956, before the Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was founded. Sometimes he embellished his writings on
the capitalist system with unnecessary comments on Jewish bankers; he also
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occasionally wrote of the "white race" having to fight over sources of energy. We
do not believe that these comments show other than run-of-the-mill Eurocentrism
and antisemitism, and Bernal and his friends thought well enough of him to ask for
a preface to a collective work on the "frustration of science" (Hall et al.,
1935). He had at least one German disciple (Bruggen, 1934) and he was mentioned
by Zmavc (1926, P. 6), but his impact in Britain and outside was very limited. He
joined the Union of Scientific Workers, an unlikely step for an Oxford professor
to take. He refused to pay the fee to receive his M.A., which meant that he was
barred from attending the general meetings of the university. He was widely
considered to be a strange character.
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TECHNOCRACY, INC.
The technocrats took Soddy to be one of their precursors. The technocracy
movement developed in the early 1930s in the United States and died away quickly
in a welter of internal recrimination and nonsense. It was led by Howard Scott, a
man of no intellectual distinction. The movement profited for some years from the
collaboration of N. King Rubbert, then a young geophysicist at Columbia
University, who more than 40 years later became widely known because of the
prediction he had made in the 1950s that U.S. domestic petroleum production would
peak around 1970. In his work of the 1950s, he analyzed the depletion of energy
and material resources by bell-shaped curves that show how much of total reserves
are still available at any one time. Many recent books on energy and
environmental questions emphasize Hubbert's analysis (for instance, Foley, 1976;
Ehrlich, Ehrlich and Holdren, 1977). Another author who had some connection with
the technocrats was Stuart Chase.
The disintegration of the technocracy movement after World War II was not a
great loss. There can be no doubt about its narrow nationalism, its
anti-intellectualism, its support for domination over Mexico and the Caribbean and
further south (under the guise of continentalism) and its tendency to see a
conspiracy of big business, Wall Street, international bankers and party
politicians, all this embellished by Howard Scott's style ("technocracy smashes
the price system", "the syphilis of business", "the dementia of democracy"). This
curious, parochial group numbered a few thousands and was active under the name of
Technocracy, Inc. They organized cavalcades of grey cars, predicted the
apocalyptic collapse of the system and had a fixation on the Vatican. In 1959
what remained of the movement was so out of touch with reality that one of its
periodicals asserted Fidel Castro was a Vatican fascist.
It is painful to bring such people out of oblivion into our work, but some
of their themes in the early l930s were certainly relevant. They emphasized the
Veblenian theme of the role of technicians in production efficiency. They were on
the whole optimistic for a great growth of production, which was frustrated by
lack of effective demand, a strong theme at the time which the policies of the New
Deal took away from them. They believed in the progress of automation, and they
also put forward the "viewpoint of social change as determined or limited by the
amount of nonhuman energy available to society" (EIsner, 1967, p. 217). This was
not a new viewpoint, but Eisner rightly points out that it had never been used as
an ideology by any political or semipolitical group. Technocracy was subjected to
some energetic jokes. In February 1933 The Nation published an article by Henry
Hazlitt entitled "Scrambled Ergs: An Examination of Technocracy", and in the same
month a book by John Lardner and Thomas Sugrue, The Crowning of Technocracy, was
published: in it the Technocrats were mocked from the foreword by "Horace Power
Ergenjoule, Soddy Professor of Implied Science", to the typesetters' note on the
final page: "This book ... was made by one machine in five energy hours, using
twenty-six British Thermal Units" (Eisner, 1967, p. 15).
M. King Hubbert's guiding theoretical light was mainly expressed in the
various editions (between 1934 and 1947) of the Technocracy Study Couree. Eisner
summarized the section that deals with social energetics (1967, p. 117):
Taking off from the physical science approach, the first few lessons
in the book are concerned with the basic concepts and measurements of
energy and its transformations and with the use of engines to convert
energy into work. At this point the concept of efficiency is intro-
duced (the ratio of work output to energy input). Man as an engine
is discussed briefly and his approximately twenty-five per cent
maximum efficiency is noted. Armed with these concepts, the student
Technocrat approaches the network of life, energy, and resources.
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The flow of life-giving energy is traced from the sun through plant
photosynthesis, herbivorous and carnivorous animal life.
The "dynamic equilibrium" or balance of nature established among
the various life forms in a given area is examined. Man's place
in this arrangement is described as uniquely disturbing in that he
has increasingly learned how to divert a larger share of energy
away from other animals to his own use. Domestication of plants and
animals and the early utilization of metals and fuels is examined.
Thus, the key to man's history is seen in his developing use of "extra-
neous" energy -- energy other than derived from the food he eats. Any
people who have "a superior energy-control technique" tend to dominate
others with lesser abilities in this area.
The jump from the study of the characteristics of the human use of energy,
compared to other animals, to the intraspecific analysis, rings the familiar
socialdarwinist bells.
In their economics, the technocrats mentioned the limited availability of
resources for the growth of some industries. The main emphasis -- naturally
enough in the early 1930s -- was on the "limitations on individual purchasing
power imposed by price system distribution" (Elsner, 1967, p. 118). They were
however not egalitarians, believing in a natural pecking order, which they also
called "functional priority". Society would be in trouble -- this was a truly
technobureaucratic theme -- if it mistook inherited social position for ability.
Though the technocrats recommended Soddy's and Fred Henderson's books, Soddy
did not collaborate with them, to judge both from Eisner's research and from
Soddy's own remarks in 1933 against energy certificates, one of the technocrats'
pet ideas. If this is the case, it shows good sense on Soddy's part, as this was
a political group that could have exploited his reputation. Thus, one of the
first official publications of Technocracy, Inc. (Howard Scott and others,
Introduction to Technocracy, John Lane The Bodley Head, London, 1933, 61 pages)
includes Soddy's Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt (1926) in the list of recommended
publications.
One possible influence apart from Soddy might have been Ostwald's
Energetische Iuerativ, which neatly encapsulated what was to become one of' the
technocrats' main themes. As we know, the connection between energy use and
social development was not an original idea of Ostwaid; it seems plausible that
even the most learned of the group would not have known about some of his
predecessors, but they must have heard about Ostwald, a truly "technocratic"
thinker in social matters.
Ttiorstein Veblen's contribution to the technocrats' ideology was not related
to the energy viewpoint but was important (Scott had known Veblen around 1920 in
New York), so much so that disclaimers were issued: "You cannot express Veblen's
economic theory in terms of Scott's theory of energy determinants." Veblen's
stand against the rationality of the price system and in favour of a technical
rationality, and his view that in the unlikely event of revolution the technicians
would have to play a decisive role, made him a clear source of inspiration.
However the technocrats did not concern themselves with his "conspicuous
consumption".
In conclusion, we are retrospectively giving shape in our work to a school
of human ecologic energetics. We are not pleased to have to include the
technocrats, a strident group of mentally uncouth people, but they cannot be left
out. A note in favour of them is that they -- or perhaps simply M.K. Hubbert --
provided an American link between social energetics before the 1930s and the
ecologic study of population and resources of the 1960s and 1970s.
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ECOLOGICAL UTOPIANISM: POPPER-LYNKEUS AND BALLOD-ATLANTICUS
Josef Popper (1838-1921), a physicist and engineeer, was born in Kahn,
Bohemia, lived in the Jewish ghetto until he was 15 and was then a student in
Prague and Vienna. As he was never appointed to a university post, he tried to
make a living by selling improvements to the steam engine. In 1862 he wrote a
paper on the transmission of electricity. This he deposited with the Viennese
Academy of Sciences, where it remained unpublished until 1884. He also wrote a
great deal about the physical principles of aerial navigation. A friend of Ernst
Mach, he had a considerable influence on the Vienna Circle. He was strongly
humanistic and antirehigious and wrote often on Voltaire. He adopted the
pseudonym Lynkeus for his literary writings, some of which were pornographic and
were appreciated by Freud, though Popper-Lynkeus showed no reciprocal appreciation
of phychoanalysis.
Popper's ecologis,n, which proposed both study of the economy of the flow of
energy and materials and moderation in the use of exhaustible resources, was
left-wing. Popper-Lynkeus would have been totally opposed to the link between
energetics and evolutionary theory as applied to different sections of the human
species. He would have opposed the fundamental tenet of functionalist ecological
anthropology that one can understand human societies by studying how they adapt to
the natural environment in which they live, as if they were biological organisms.
He argued against the use of organic metaphors for the analysis of human society
and inveighed against Haeckel's socialdarwinism (1912, pp. 75-88) on the grounds
that human social conflicts could not be analyzed in terms of natural selection.
He wrote against antisemitism. When he advocated birth control, he pointed out
that this had nothing to do with eugenic proposals. He scorned "race improvement"
(1912, p. 774).
In 1912 Popper published a long book, Die ailgemeine Phrpfhicht, developing
ideas he had first presented in 1878 in one of the chapters of Dam Recht zu
leben. The title and subtitle translate as "On the general duty of nutrition as a
solution to the social question, statistically researched, with a demonstration of
the lack of theoretical and practical validity of economic theory". It gave a
detailed account of the resources available to the German economy just before
1914. His first objective was to calculate the human work requirement that would
guarantee the whole population a subsistence of food, clothing, housing and health
services; this would be achieved by means of a Nirpf1icht (instead of
a Wehrpflicht), that is, by civil rather than military conscription. The second
objective was to discover how the use of exhaustible resources could be gradually
reduced, so that the economic system would be permanently viable.
The economy would thus be divided into two. The basic sector would provide
subsistence free to everybody, using the labour force of men and women.
Popper-Lynkeus pointed out that such an extramercantile method of fulfilling basic
needs would increase women's freedom, as this distribution of goods could be to
adult individuals rather than to families. The necessary period of conscription
was carefully calculated; here Popper took issue with figures supplied by other
less scientific writers: Hertzka, Bellamy, Anton Menger and also Bebel. There
would be 12 years' service for men and seven for women, with a 35-hour week. This
work would be organized by regional or state authorities. (Josef Popper was not
an anarchist, though some of his other views come near to anarchism. Thus, in Dam
Recht zu leben [1878], he wrote that each man should himself decide whether or not
to take part in a war, and not the government, parliament, or a referendum,
because each individual should decide on his own health or life.). As there would
be resources and labour left over from those used for the subsistence sector, the
economy would have a second sector, which would function according to market
principles, though limits could be set to the amount of labour that each employer
would be allowed to hire.
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Karl Popper chose to classify Popper-Lynkeus's proposals as "piecemeal
social engineering", comparable to the introduction of a health service or
subsidized housing, rather than "utopian social engineering" (1945, vol. 1, p.
143). But it is doubtful that the proposals to abolish the need to sell labour
and diminish the use of exhaustible resources, to say nothing of the strongly
egalitarian flavour of these proposals, can really be relegated to the category of
"piecemeal social engineering". Neurath thought they were scientific utopianism,
which is certainly what they seem nowadays. In 1919 Neurath sent a telegram to
Josef Popper from Munich, with the joy and devotion of a disciple, announcing that
the revolutionary council was going to implement his programme.
People in most developed countries might remark that some of
Popper-Lynkeus's more attractive proposals have already been incorporated in the
welfare state without interfering with property rights and freedom of markets,
including the market for labour. But welfare states comprise a small proportion
of humankind, and their prosperity has come in part from the use of exhaustible
resources and from the poverty of other peoples. A ,judgement of the distribution
of resources and commodities through the market mechanism favoured by the
liberals depends on how one views the intra- and intergenerational distribution of
purchasing power.
Popper-Lynkeus himself (in his autobiography) explained the origins,
intention and reception of his proposals. He had long been worried by the effects
of so-called technical progress, and in 1886 published a long article on "The
aesthetic and cultural significance of technical progress", following a train of
thought started at the world exhibition of 1873 in Vienna. Perhaps the aesthetic
thrill aroused by the transatlantic cable or by flying was analogous to that of
the Athenians at the unveiling of a statue of Phidias or at the completion of a
new public building. Of course, opinions on artistic works were only expressions
of trends in taste; they did not contain any truth-value and could not be forced
upon anyone. Nevertheless, he was sceptical about the benefits of technical
progress. Some pages in Das Recht zu leben dealt with the harmful effects of
machinery. He had proposed that technical progress should be made harmless by
appropriate sociopolitical institutions or, to put it plainly, by socialist
institutions (1924, p. 62). This would be achieved by the separation of a
so-called free private economy -- an economy with circulation of money and free
competition -- from an economy for existence, based on obligations. This idea,
later developed at length in Die aligemeine Nährpflicht and statistically shown to
be viable, depended on the introduction of "conscription for food production" by
which all that was needed for a healthy and comfortable life would be produced and
distributed to all citizens without exception, from birth to death, not in the
form of money but in nature. All the rest, on top of such minimum needs, would
belong to the private economy, in which anyone would take part or not, as he or
she wished, after having fulfilled service in the "food production
army" (Nuaraee).
Popper-Lynkeus complained about the predictable reception accorded his
proposals. The German marxist journal Zukz,ft dismissed them as only
"half-socialist" because they guaranteed only a minimum and not all necessities
(1924, p. 81). Others (including the Austrian social democrats) degraded them by
using the little words "New Utopia" (1924, p. 92). After 1912 a small group of
people in Austria and Germany formed an ailge.eine Nrpflictit society, dedicated
to his scheme. Some Austrian writers in economics, such as Otto Neurath
(1882-1945), participated in the minor local cult of Popper-Lynkeus. Others did
not even mention him, where they might well have done. Thus Schumpeter, a
contemporary of Neurath, did not include Popper-Lynkeus in his history of economic
analysis. Schumpeter's exclusion of Popper-Lynkeus suggests the view that the
computation of available resources and their use to satisfy human needs over time
is not part of economics. Hayek did not include him in his list of
"neo-Saintsimoriian social engineers" (1952), although he very much included
Neurath, who had arrived at his views through Popper-Lynkeus and
Ballod-Atlanticus.
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Popper-Lynkeus's proposals show some similarities with economic planning in
the Soviet Union from the late 19208 onward; innumerable "material balances" were
in fact established by Popper-Lynkeus (1912). But his emphasis on basic needs and
especially his proposal not to increase so-called capital accumulation and
economic growth, but rather to diminish the use of exhaustible resources so that
the economy would be permanently viable, are quite different from Soviet
concepts. Popper-Lynkeus's ecologism is most in evidence in the last 100 pages of
his book (in the 1912 edition) entitled "The Future of the State of the Future".
The expression Der Zukunfteetaat was taken from Bebel and from Ballod-Atlanticus
(1898), and Josef Popper and Ballod discussed each other's figures. In these 100
pages Josef Popper explained the supply of solar energy to Earth. He advanced the
hypothesis that solar energy had a radioactive source. He then calculated with
care to what extent water power, wind power etc. could replace coal. He carried
out similar calculations for different metals and for fertilizers (costing
nitrogen in kilowatts). His conclusions tended to be pessimistic; it would be
difficult to diminish coal consumption and maintain the standard of living; hence
his emphasis on birth control.
When discussing the substitution of renewable energy for coal,
Popper-Lynkeus carried out a detailed analysis (1912, pp. 729-730) of the energy
costs and value of Kartoffel Spiritus, alcohol from potatoes, giving estimates of
the (very large) area that would be needed to substitute it for coal for domestic
heating. He criticised Kropotkin (whom otherwise he greatly admired) because he
had asserted that enormous potato crops could be grown in greenhouses. Josef
Popper pointed out that greenhouse farming in northern Europe used so much energy
from coal that its energy balance did not compare favourably with that of open-air
agriculture. He made his own calculation to show Kropotkin's mistake.
Writing on the "Maithusian problem" (which he thought was misnamed as
Malthus had not done a proper study of the rules of human demography),
Popper-Lynkeus (1912, pp. 754-755) entered the argument on the carrying capacity
of the Earth. He quoted Franz Oppenheimer's estimate of 200 billion persons as
the upper limit, on the basis of the productivity achieved in greenhouse farming.
Again Popper-Lynkeus emphasized (quoting Ballod-Atlanticus) that one could not
generalize the results of greenhouse farming to the world at large, because of the
required energy input from coal. This anticipates by some 60 years Gerald Foley's
critique of Cohn Clark's estimates on land use and population growth (Foley,
1976), based on Clark's failure to consider the flow of energy into agriculture.
Popper-Lynkeus also suggested that the price system did not provide a good
criterion for deciding whether to produce alcohol from potatoes in large amounts.
He pointed out that if alcohol from potatoes was used for heating, transport etc.,
this would have the beneficial side effect that no alcohol would remain to drink;
on the other hand, it was possible that no potatoes would remain to eat.
Controversies over the use of biomass for food energy or fuel energy have a long
history.
Nevertheless, even Popper-Lynkeus could, on occasion, adopt a parochial
outlook. Thus, he proposed (1912, pp. 735-736) the eurocratic idea of importing
peanut oil from the German colonies in Africa and from Spain to burn it in diesel
engines, as Rudolf Diesel had just announced (in 1912) that his engines could work
on vegetable oils. Popper-Lynkeus, however, stated that this proposal was
conditional to obtaining more information on yields and energy costs in peanut
farming
Popper-Lynkeus's work was characterized (in contrast to other utopian
writings of this period) not only by the thoroughness of its statistics and by its
ecologic..conservationist aspect, but also because his proposals were addressed,
if not to the whole world, at least to a considerable section of it.
Popper-Lynkeus's utopia was not based on the migration of a small group of people
from Europe to America or to Africa, as in Cabet's Icaria or in Hertzka's
Freiland. His achievable utopia, which did not indulge in the literary fiction of
abolishing scarcity, was universal in intention, though not in computation.
Ballod-Atlanticus
Karl Ballod (1864-1933), who took the pseudonym Atlanticus from Francis
Bacon's Nova Atlantis (1627), was an economist and demographer living in Berlin.
Early in his professional life he made studies of' colonization in Brazil and of
the Russian economy. He published several editions of Der Zukunftsstaat, the
first in 1898 with a preface by Kauteky and the fourth in 1927. This book was
also published around 1905 in Russia.
Ballad made a realistic appraisal of the resources at the disposal of future
society. Like Josef Popper, he wrote a careful account of how the economy would
work in the future. His approach is "scientific utopianism". There is a clear
difference between Ballad's approach and planning in socialist countries, where it
boils down to adding a few percentage points to the levels achieved in the
previous planning period. Planning does not contemplate radical changes in the
composition of production.
Ballod, in the 1920s at least, was simultaneously antibolshevik and
antisocial-democrat, though he was neither a liberal nor an anarchist. His
political position could be described as a somewhat technocratic ecologism.
Popper-Lynkeus had written that Marx was, for him, an inspiration more because of
his capacity for historical prognosis; a socialist program had to start from an
ethical premise, and ethical systems could not be derived from the march of
history (Popper-Lynkeus, 1912, p. 322). Ballad saw the origin of his ideas in
Marx, but Marx had not supplied a blueprint for the day after the revolution; he
had thought out everything, but only until the critical day (1927, p. 7).
1 Ecologists usually trace to Transeau (1926, in Kormondy, 1965) the first
careful estimate of photosynthetic yield not in laboratory conditions but in
agriculture, i.e. in maize growing in Illinois. The following comment is of
interest: "The worry of Transeau's day was not only food but fuel also. Fossil
fuels on which modern civilizations are based obviously would not last forever,
and the exhaustion of the world supply then seemed more imminent than it does now
because the total reserves were much underestimated. There was then no promise of
atomic power to supply the needs of the future, and the only resource seemed to be
to grow fuel; to use the energy stored by contemporary plants rather than by those
long dead. It became important to know how efficiently crops fixed solar energy
in order to calculate the possibilities of producing fuel for power stations and
motor cars by agriculture" (Colinvaux, 1973, pp. 152-153). One inescapable
conclusion of our reading of Popper-Lynkeus's work is, once again, to raise the
question (to which we have no answer): why did modern agricultural energy
accounting not develop as a subdiscipline of agricultural science and of
agricultural economics much earlier than it did?
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One difference between Popper-Lynkeus and Ballod-Atlanticus is that Ballod
calculated energy coats only occasionally. Another difference from Popper-Lyrkeus
is that Ballod was certainly more technocratic, as his choice of pseudonym shows;
Francis Bacon had proposed a society ruled by the possessors of' knowledge.
Ballad disliked economists -- he was close in some ways to the American
technocrats of the 1930s. Writing in German in the 1920s, he was full of
enthusiasm for synthetic textiles and synthetic protein and for mechanized
agriculture, combined nevertheless with dispersed urbanization and a multitude of
domestic gardens. He admired Henry Ford, one capitalist who really profited from
the possibilities opened up by increases in productivity and growth of the market,
and who was therefore totally opposed to cartelization and restriction of output,
but Ballod was also -- and this is crucial -- against the private car.
The nucleus of Ballad's book is a computation of how many people could be
nourished by the production from a standard farm of 500 hectares; a Noraalgut.
Such a farm was assumed to have not very fertile soil (a realistic assumption for
northern Germany) and to use mechanical traction, the reason being that otherwise
a great deal of land would be needed to feed the animals. If rotation was
intensive enough, this land could be put instead to the alternative use of hunan
nutrition. If tractors were used, oil from outside the farm would of course be
necessary. Ballad reckoned the value of this oil in energy units, but he did not
quite establish the global energy balance of this model farm. Assuming the use of
tractors, 2000 people could be nourished from 500 hectares, though the number
would depend on the amount of meat in their diet.
How would this pattern of mechanized model farms fit in with the rest of the
economy? Ballad opposed industrial and urban concentration, on the grounds that
it led simultaneously to the construction of large numbers of new apartment
buildings in the great cities and to the deterioration of abandoned rural
housing. Workers' quarters were built so close together that it became impossible
for their inhabitants to contribute to their own food supply. As a rule, cities
should not have more than 100 000 inhabitants, thus saving most of the materials
used in high-rise buildings and in the infrastructure of the large cities. For
Berlin in the 1920s this type of' consideration arrived a little late, but for
urban planners in Mexico, Brazil and other countries, Ballad's book would still
repay close study. There is nothing romantic in it, only a collection of rather
arid computations, showing the amounts of materials of different sorts needed to
house all Germans in towns and cities of moderate dimensions within a framework of
mechanized model farms and domestic gardens. These amounts were then compared
with those required for a pattern of concentrated urbanization. Ballod criticized
even Eberiezer Howard because in his view the gardens in his garden cities were too
small to allow any significant contribution to food intake. He did not quote
Patrick Geddes, and neither Geddes nor Lewis Mumford -- whose erudition casts a
wide net -- quoted him, perhaps as a result of the triple censorial alliance of
liberal economists social democrats and Stalinists (and also Leninists in this
particular context5 who relegated to the attic of our intellectual past such
authors as Ballad and Josef Popper.
Another drawback of urban concentration was that the waste of the big cities
was not used to fertilize agricultural land. In the pattern of settlement he
proposed, each Normalgut would support a community nearby. In contrast, he
calculated the units of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium in the excrement and
other waste produced annually by Greater Berlin which would have fertilized
200 000 hectares (1927, p. 170), but which in fact became a huge and costly
disposal problem. This is a calculation that would have pleased Liebig and Marx.
He made similar calculations for the entire German economy.
Ballod's attack on the farms of industrial urbanization had little in
common, in our view, with the antirational, antitechnologic and antidemocratic
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tendencies at the time in Germany and elsewhere. Ballod's dung accounts may
scarcely be called romantic nature-loving, as were the Wandervögel and the
Artananen, allegedly a German disease to which even social democracy was prone.
In his well-judged effort to exonerate I-Iaeckel and other monists from any
direct responsibility for nazism despite their socialdarwinism, Kelly (1981 p.
134) pointed out that German socialists supported not only Haeckel but even
authors as reactionary as Bölsche, and therefore these authors' views had a much
wider and diffuse influence than that assumed by the partisans of an exclusive and
direct monist-nazi intellectual connection (such as Gasman, 1971). As Kelly puts
it, social democratic support for Haeckel and Bölsche meant at least tacit party
sanction for locating the origins of workers' problems in urbanization rather than
in class exploitation. Several points arise here.
Overcrowding and struggles for green space, better urban transport and rent
rebates are aspects of the class struggle. But the critique of urbanization and
the critique of capitalist exploitation could be brought together not only in this
sense, traditional in marxism since Engels wrote on workers' living conditions in
Manchester and on the housing question in general, but also in the ecological
discussion on the productive forces of energy flows and materials cycles. Social
democratic nature-loving -- such as it was -- did not produce this ecological
critique, which was compatible with an appeal to reason and alien to the mystic
brand of ecologism.
Both Ballod and Popper-Lynkeus remained aloof from the reaction against
rational scientific analysis and specialized learning. In thi8 they were much
closer to social democracy (and, incidentally, to anarchism in the kropotkinian
tradition) than to the conservative back-to-nature movements. There was little
distance from the latter to the theosophy and anthroposophy of Rudolf Steiner,
which links up with the irrational, apocalyptic ecologism in which back to nature
means back to God and religion.
In the German-Austrian context it is important to locate Ballod and
Popper-Lynkeus carefully between technocratic social engineering on the one hand,
and romantic, conservative, religious nature-loving on the other. It is a
characteristic of the struggle for free thought in Europe in the nineteenth
century that religion was not simply superseded by agnosticism. Attempts to
substitute science or pseudoscience for religion were made by Comte in France and,
later, by the monist movement (or parts of it) in Germany. As Haeckel was
prominent in this attempt and as it was he also who introduced the word "ecology"
into scientific discourse, it is worthwhile to emphasize the distance with authors
such as Ballod and Popper-Lynkeus.
When Ballod considered the costs in materials and energy of alternative
transport systems, he left his technocratic optimism on one side. He made a case
against the expansion of the motor industry and implicitly against an economic and
social ideal that, in spite of its rhetoric, proposed industrial urbanization and
intensive use of exhaustible resources from German or foreign territories.
Ballod explained (1927, p. 262) that there were 20 million cars, or one for
every six persons, in the U.S., 778 000 in Great Britain, 574 000 in France and
308 000 in Germany. Germany then imported 1.2 million tonnes of oil per year
(which we might compare with the 100 million tonnes of oil and oil products
imported now per year by West Germany alone), and Ballod thought that the figure
could be doubled. Since one car consumed about 1200 kg of petrol per year, plus
lubricant oil, the number of cars would be able to grow very slightly supposing a
continued dependence on imported oil. Oil from coal, however, could in principle
allow a considerable increase in the number of cars, perhaps up to 10 million.
But Ballad thought such a use of coal reserves was irrational, because lack of
water power in Germany made it advisable to keep coal for the production of
electricity. Besides, air pollution caused by cars, which one could already
smell, was worse than the plague, and this was a further argument in favour of
public transport (1927, p. 266).
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Ballod's prediction with regard to cars was spectacularly mistaken. There
are now about 20 million cars in West Germany alone and, not less remarkably,
there are also a few million in East Germany. However, from a world perspective,
the present ratio of cars to population (one car per 15 persons, about 300 million
cars to 4.5 billion inhabitants) will be difficult to increase; it has probably
decreased since 1973. The ratio varies considerably both from one country to
another and from one social class to another within these countries, not excluding
the so-called socialist countries. It is doubtful that cars will become generally
available (one might argue that a car is a "positional" good in Fred Hirsch's
sense) not because of negative externalities such as traffic congestion, but
because of oil consumption. If you have one, you are depriving somebody else from
having one, either now or in the future. Ballod would have agreed, and therefore
he can hardly be classified as an all-out technocratic Fordist thinker. Ballad
did not envisage a future of poverty. His computations include, for example, the
number of workers (100 000) who could construct pianos for Germany's musical
needs. Ballod's utopia did not presuppose the elimination of the premise of
economics, scarcity, yet he vigorously opposed the economist's way of dealing with
scarcity, through the market or market-surrogates.
He had bitter words (in the 1927 edition) for the socialists who had failed
to take advantage of the revolutionary moment in 1918. He had been a member of
the Commission for Socialization and had seen at close quarters how the socialists
had not even nationalized coal. They had switched to free-market principles.
What was worse, in practice they favoured cartelization. This they tried to hide
under the name of "economic democracy".
Ballod proposed a mixture of state, provincial and communal public
enterprises (including model farms). No egalitarian, he reserved an important
position for technicians, who should be paid more as an incentive for more people
to receive the necessary education. He was aware that his attitude of favouring
technicians would be criticized. During World War I he had been criticized
because of his recommendation that the number of pigs should be restricted so that
more energy and protein would be directly available for human consumption; a
recommendati9n that earned him and others the name of Schweineprofessorem (pig-
professors).' His conversations with Moltke on protein requirements (on which he
included accurate computations) had led to nothing because Prussian officialdom
did not understand such matters (1927, pp. 27-29). It was better to place one's
trust in technicians than in bureaucrats or economists. The Austrian school,
which had finally triumphed among the German professors of economics,
was Neo-Manchestertiun and Seholastik. '
Among the authors we have studied, one difference between the
German-Austrian and the British (Geddes, Soddy) is that the Germans and P,ustrians,
because of the relevance of social revolution, in some cases (such as those of
Ballad and Popper-Lynkeus) went beyond the ecological critique of conventional
economics and drew up detailed, global economic plans (though this is not quite
the appropriate word). This element of "scientific utopianism" is what appealed
to Otto Neurath.
1 A play of words, the darwinist professors had been known as Affenprofessoren
(monkey-professors).
2 Hayek failed, however, to include him in his list of "neo-Saintsimonians". We
learned of him through Neurath's and Popper-Lynkeus's writings. Cf. also the
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